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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the covenants of single property commercial mortgage-backed
securities (SP CMBS). The analysis of the covenants reveals the degree to which
bondholder protection, beyond recourse to the asset, is found in this form of restriction.
The thesis first presents a literature review of studies examining the role of bond
covenants found in unsecured corporate debt agreements, and then offers a discussion of
the factors affecting the issuance of SP CMBS securities. Chapter 5 presents the analysis
of the findings.
Prospectuses and memoranda from 17 SP CMBS indentures are examined (14 from 1992-
94 and three from 1985-86) and the covenants tabulated. The review of covenants offers
a qualitative survey of this aspect of the SP CMBS instrument. A summary of each
covenant is entered into the data base, facilitating the sorting and grouping of the covenant
types found in each of the documents. The most frequently observed covenants are
further tabulated and examined for their role in the agreements generally. They are then
compared for variation and similarity of restrictions.
The findings show overall similarities in covenant structure common to both asset and
placement type. When variation in the covenants are found, these tend to be concerned
with investment in the secured property. Other variations include rights to expand and
contract the property and rights of defeasance. In addition, certain SP CMBS issues
contain covenants of the indenture which are not found in the majority of documents
examined.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Stewart C. Myers
Title: Gordon Y Billard Professor of Finance
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INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the role mortgage and indenture covenants play in the performance of
single property commercial mortgage-backed securities (SP CMBS). Specifically the
investigation focuses on the differences in covenants due to the type of property, the type
of security and public vs private placement. The similarities and differences in the forms
of covenants are analyzed. In addition, the ratings agencies' criteria for SP CMBS are
discussed for their influence on underwriting standards and requirements for covenant-like
restrictions in recent deals.
The analysis shows that private placements of SP CMBS securities issues done under SEC
Rule 144A and in the European bond market have negligible differences in documentation
from SEC registered, publicly placed issues. Though technically categorized as private,
144A placements seem designed to offer levels of marketability and liquidity that are
equivalent to those of their public counterparts. By avoiding the registration process these
private deals incur lower costs of issuance to the borrower. The relative standardization
of documentation observed for public and private deals in the study supports this view.
The research also indicates that frequently occurring SP CMBS mortgage covenants that
are most often tailored have to do with rights of expansion and contraction of the
property, additional indebtedness and casualty. Less frequently occurring covenants are
those pertaining to easements, management, special maintenance, defeasance and financial
statements. These less frequent restrictions are included as a means of facilitating greater
borrower flexibility.
The thesis is divided into five chapters, plus an introduction and conclusion. Chapter 1
describes types of mortgage-backed securities and reviews related bond covenant research
performed in the area of corporate bonds. This research is discussed for its relevance to
SP CMBS covenants. The first paper, Smith and Warner [1990], is a qualitative analysis
of the types and functions of corporate bond covenants. The second, Kahan and Tuckman
[1993], focuses on the differences between publicly and privately placed debt using a
sample of placements from 1986-90. Their findings indicate that private placements tend
to have more restrictive, yet more easily renegotiated covenants. In the third paper,
Asquith and Wizman [1990], quantify the effect of covenants to bondholders during
leveraged buyouts. The chapter ends with a section on related research questions.
Chapter 2 is a general analysis of the development of CMBS market. The research for
this section was completed using a review of the literature and through discussions with
individuals involved in the origination and purchase of CMBS. It outlines an overview of
the economic conditions in the real estate market during the early 1990's and discusses the
institutional changes that stimulated the issuance and growth of this security. The last
sections of the chapter look at the major participants in the CMBS market.
Chapter 3 begins the specific discussion of the SP CMBS instrument and uses a
hypothetical example plus two recent publicly placed issues to develop an understanding
of SP CMBS. The deals are examined as to cost of issuance, concerns for property type
and non-covenant protective measures found in the indentures. A section on the legal
envelope clarifies the features of single-purpose entity and bankruptcy remoteness. The
last section is a description of the SP CMBS ratings process.
Chapter 4 gives an overview of additional concerns associated with SP CMBS. These
are public vs. private placement, secondary markets, default risk, balloon risk and the
process of real estate evaluation. Each is reviewed for the effects on covenants of the
mortgage and the indenture.
Chapter 5 details the analysis of the covenants in light of the earlier framework presented
in the paper. Frequently occurring covenant types are defined and analyzed for their role
in the indenture. The survey of covenants is qualitative in nature and uses a tabulated
format to outline the basic features of selected covenant types as they appear in all 17
indentures. The chapter also considers related, non-covenant restrictions that are found in
SP CMBS indentures. Their presentation follows the format for the discussion of the
covenants.
Finally, the conclusions summarize the findings of the paper and offer related questions for
further study.
CHAPTER 1 MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES & RELATED RESEARCH
1.1 Background
Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) are bonds secured by mortgages on
income producing commercial real estate assets, and single-property commercial
mortgage-backed securities (SP CMBS) are a "subset" of the CMBS market.
Securitization converts one or more mortgage loans secured by real estate assets into
marketable notes or bonds that can be sold to a range of investors. Specifically, a SP
CMBS is backed by one commercial mortgage (usually in excess of $40 million) on a
single property. Cash flows from the underlying mortgage loan are used to create classes
of securities which have different yields and risk profiles.
SP CMBS are becoming a competitive alternative to conventional debt for real estate. In
the last five years, economic and regulatory pressures contributed to the decline in
participation of life insurance companies and conventional mortgage lenders in providing
loans for commercial real estate. Related to this change are risk-based capital
requirements for life insurance companies, which took effect at the end of 1993 and have
further reduced participation. As a consequence, the SP CMBS market has developed 1)
as a means for real estate borrowers to access the capital markets for financing, and 2) in
response to institutional investors wanting to hold real estate debt in the form of a security
rather than as whole loans.
The concepts for securitization of commercial mortgages grew out of the activity in the
residential mortgage-backed securities market. As a result, commercial mortgage
securities are issued in formats mirroring those of the residential market. SP CMBSs have
characteristics that make them similar to both traditional commercial mortgages as well as
to corporate bonds. As a placement of a single mortgage, SP CMBS require lender(s) to
evaluate the risks associated with a single asset. Yet as bonds, SP CMBS facilitate the
participation of multiple lenders in the financing of individual properties. The bonds are
rated, as are other tradable debt securities, and the developing secondary market for SP
CMBS provides liquidity to an asset type that previously had relatively little when
compared to other investment classes.
1.2 Types of Mortgage-Backed Securities
As stated above, the bundling and securitizing of commercial mortgages, or pooling, is an
outgrowth of similar activity in the residential mortgage market. The growth of this
market in the 1980's fostered the creation of a number of mortgaged-backed instruments.
The following descriptions of four types of mortgage-backed instruments are meant to
give the reader an understanding of the securities currently in use. A matrix of the
investment characteristics for each of the following types is found in Appendix A.
Single property securities are not all issued in the same format. As with pooled securitized
mortgages, SP CMBS can take several forms. The following discussion sketches the basic
characteristics of the mortgage-related securities in use. Most often SP CMBS are issued
in the form of mortgage pass-through securities and collateralized mortgage obligations.
They are both described below.
1.2.1 Mortgage-Backed Bonds. Mortgage-Backed Bond (MBB) are used primarily by
private mortgage originators such as mortgage companies and commercial banks as a
means of replenishing funds for the origination of new mortgages. Issuers of MBBs
establish a pool of mortgages and in turn issue bonds to investors. This issuer retains
ownership of the mortgages, though they are pledged as security and placed in trust with a
third party trustee. The trustee guards that the provisions of the bond agreement are
followed. Characteristically MBBs are issued as fixed rate coupon notes. Complete and
timely payment of interest on the bonds is ensured by "overcollateralizing" the dollar value
of the outstanding loan balances relative to the value of the bond issue. As an example, a
bond issuance of $100 million may be backed by a pool of $175 million in mortgages. The
range of overcollateralization is anywhere from 125% to 240%. Additional credit
enhancements are sometimes added to ensure full and timely payment.
1.2.2 Mortgage Pass-Through Securities. Mortgage Pass-Through Securities (MPTs)
are an outgrowth of the 1968 mortgage-backed guarantee program initiated by "Ginnie
Mae" (GNMA). 1 It was enacted to allow mortgage-backed bonds to compete with
corporate bonds in the investment markets. Though GNMA could not solve the problem
of prepayment risk 2 inherent in residential mortgage loans, it guaranteed the timely
payment of interest on residential mortgages, thereby eliminating default risk on these
loans. Thus the securities issued against these mortgages carry the "full faith and credit"
of the U.S. government behind them.
1The Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) was created in 1968 under the
Housing and Urban Development Act. GNMA provides special assistance, management and
liquidation functions for dealing with subsidized mortgage purchases for federal housing
programs.
2 Prepayment risk refers to the risk in mortgage securitization of early payoff by the
mortgagor(s) of the underlying mortgage(s). This has the effect of shortening the duration
of the security.
The Pass-Through represents a fractional undivided interest in the "corpus" of a trust
containing a fixed pool of mortgages backing the security. 3 Because of this, the MPT
represents an equity ownership interest in the mortgage pool as opposed to a debt
obligation of the issuer. Using the trust, the cash flow from the mortgages is "passed
through" by the trustee to the certificate holders on the payment schedule of the
mortgages. The purchasers of the pass-through securities pay taxes as though they hold
the mortgage directly. Privately issued pass-throughs began in 1977.4
1.2.3 Mortgage Pay-Through Bonds. A third type of mortgage-backed instrument is
the Mortgage Pay-Through Bond (MPTBs). This security is described as a hybrid having
the characteristics of both the MBBs and the MPTs5 . These are bonds (debt obligations
of the issuer) which are the general obligation of the issuing entity and usually have terms
of five to ten years, and most typically are-originated by private sector firms. Typically,
the issues of MPTBs are overcollateralized. This overcollateralization is favored by
institutional fixed-income investors such as pension funds, bank trust departments and
general fund managers. 6
Pay-through bonds supply a cash flow to the issuing entity. Unlike pass-through
certificates, the cash flows for MTPBs are not dedicated to the payment of the bonds, but
are instead paid directly to the issuer. The issuer, in turn, is obligated to make the
payment on the outstanding bonds. In this regard, the MPTB instrument is similar to
corporate bonds--they have a stated maturity, semi-annual interest and no
agency/government guarantee. One of the significant (cosmetic) benefits of the MPTB to
3Brueggeman, William B., Fisher, Jeffery D., Real Estate Finance and Investments, Ninth
Edition, Irwin, Boston, MA, 1993, p. 7 3 0 .
4Richards, David Alan, "'Gradable and Tradable': The Securitization of Commercial Real
Estate Mortgages," Real Estate Law Journal [Vol. 16: 99 19871, p. 105.
5Brueggeman and Fisher, [1993], p.757.
6Richards, [1987], p. 106.
institutions holding real estate mortgages is the ability to liquidate low-yielding loans
without writing off potential capital losses--the issuer keeps the ownership of the
mortgage loans that are providing the collateral.
1.2.4 Collateralized Mortgage Obligation. The fourth type of MBS considered here is
the collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO). The CMO is in essence a pay-through
bond divided into multiple tranches. Typically, a CMO consists of a four tranche
structure. The interest is distributed on each payment date to all classes of bonds. The
principal, in contrast, is usually paid first to the most senior class of notes until paid off.
Then the next class is paid its principal until paid in full, and so on down the line. The last
tranche, the "Z" piece receives principal and interest payments only after all other classes
have been satisfied.
1.2.5 REMICs. A final note concerning MBS deals with the tax entity known as a real
estate mortgage investment conduit (REMIC). Until the adoption of the REMIC category
for the holding of real estate mortgages, the demand for CMOs was constrained by tax
regulation,. which did not allow passive trust status to an entity issuing multiple classes of
divided ownership interests in assets such as mortgages or the cash flow from a pool of
assets. 7 This made the CMO vulnerable to taxation both at the issuing entity level and at
the investor level. The Internal Revenue Service considered the CMO multiple tranche
structure with the issuer's retained equity piece to be too similar to that of a corporation's
issuance of debt. This made the CMO's passive investment status questionable. 8
REMIC legislation was passed as a part of the 1986 Tax Reform Act. Its purpose is to
allow the issuer of mortgage-backed securities some flexibility in managing the mortgages
7Richards, [1987], p. 109.
8Brueggeman and Fisher, [1993], p. 790.
and their income. In essence, the choice of REMIC tax status by the issuing entity enables
the trust to have a passive 9 status relative to the flow of income from the mortgage to the
security holders. In addition, REMIC structure allows financing done through this vehicle
to be treated as sale of assets for tax purposes. Because of this, the issuer may decide to
form a REMIC to offer either a sale of assets or collateralized debt. Further, the REMIC
may be organized as a corporation, association, trust or partnership.
9Passive here refers to income or loss from a business where the investor does not materially
participate in the management or operation of the property.
1.3 Related Research--Corporate Indentures
This section of the chapter briefly presents three relevant studies of corporate bonds and
outlines the findings and conclusions associated with each. Much of the existing evidence
concerning debt covenants comes from the investigation of corporate bonds. Further, the
research done in the area of bond covenants for unsecured corporate debt offers an
instructive parallel for the study of covenants in SP CMBS secured debt. They are
discussed here specifically to determine a framework for our study of covenants governing
SP CMBS.
1.3.1 Unsecured Corporate Bonds. In the unsecured corporate bond, covenants are the
mechanism for restricting shareholder and management actions that may conflict with
bondholder interests. Shareholders and bondholders each holds a stake in the value of the
firm, and the value of those claims are in part dependent upon the actions taken by the
firm's management. In addition, the management is charged with maximizing the total
value of the firm--debt plus equity--through its decisions. Conflicts arise out of the
differences in incentives and expectations associated with each entity, and the existence of
bond covenants specifically serve to protect the bondholders' claim against competing
actions of the management and shareholders.
An example of this conflict is a firm having outstanding debt, that chooses to liquidate its
assets to pay out dividends to the stockholders. The result is a lowering of the firm's value
and a subsequent loss to the bondholder claim. Additional sources of the conflict arise
from claim dilution, asset substitution and underinvestment. Given these sources of
conflict, their effective management through the covenants should increase the total value
of the firm.
1.3.2 Smith and Warner [1990]. The analysis of bond covenants as a determinant and
predictor of bond performance is addressed by Smith and Warner [1990] Their paper
qualitatively examines the bond covenants for unsecured corporate debt. They find that
privately placed debt agreements contain more detailed restrictions on a firm's behavior
than do public issues.10 Their findings also indicate that private corporate issues tend to
be done for riskier debt than do the public counterparts. Central to both of these findings
is the observation that direct placements and private placements allow the enforcement of
these more detailed and restrictive covenants without an intermediary trustee.
They divide corporate bond covenants into four categories:"I These categories, as will be
shown later, roughly correspond to those for SP CMBS mortgage covenants.
. Production/investment covenants
. Dividend covenants
. Financing covenants
. Bonding covenants
Finally, Smith and Warner discuss two theories are offered as to the value derived from
the covenants and their effect on the total value of a firm. The first is the Irrelevance
Hypothesis and the second is the Costly Contracting Hypothesis.12
Under the Irrelevance Hypothesis, controlling of the bondholder-stockholder conflict does
not change the value of the firm. In contrast, the Costly Contracting Hypothesis states
that control of the bondholder-stockholder conflict through restrictive covenants can
increase the overall value of the firm. From this point of view, the presence of covenants
act to lower the costs associated with monitoring the actions of the stockholders. As an
1oSmith, C.W. Jr., and Warner, J.B., Analysis of Bond Covenants, The Modern Theory of
Corporate Finance, McGraw-Hill Publishing, New York, 1990, p. 200.
11Smith and Warner, [1990], p. 174.
12Smith and Warner, [1990], p. 1 7 0 -1 .
example, the presence of covenants reduces the loss to bondholders resulting from the a
firm with outstanding debt investing in risky projects. To the detriment of the
bondholders, the risky projects may increase the value of the equity while decreasing the
value of the debt. Further, financial contracting is assumed to be costly, but these costs
are assumed to be outweighed by the benefits of the bond covenants to the noteholders.
1.3.3 Kahan and Tuckman [1993]. Kahan and Tuckman [1993] investigate the
differences found in public and private corporate debt covenants. Their paper compares
the terms of 63 privately placed debt agreements with those found in public bond
indentures. The findings indicated that, "(1) private corporate debt agreements require
more monitoring and more frequent re-negotiation. (2) Private agreements provide
lenders with the means to monitor borrowers more carefully. (3) Private agreements
attempt to control intra-claim conflicts (arising between noteholders of the same bond
issue). (4) Private agreement payment terms are tailored to suit the asset-liability
management needs of lenders by avoiding embedded interest rate options."13
Their study is relevant for its investigation of differences in covenant structure due to
placement type. As with the other studies cited here from the research of corporate
indentures, Kahan and Tuckman look at unsecured debt. The analysis indicates that
placement type affects covenant structure. This by extension should be observable in SP
CMBS covenants of publicly and privately placed issues.
13Kahan, Marcel and Tuckman, Bruce, 1993, "Private vs. Public Lending: Evidence from
Covenants," working paper, Batterymarch Finance Seminar, Sloan School of Management,
abstract.
The Kahan and Tuckman sample of corporate indentures--from 1986-1990--predates the
adoption of SEC Rule 144A.14 . In contrast, 14 of the 17 SP CMBS prospectuses
examined in this paper are from the time period following the rule's adoption. Subsequent
to the adoption and use of Rule 144A, a type of private placement resembling public
transactions has developed in the debt markets. Effects of this difference in time frame are
discussed in Chapter 4.
1.3.4 Asquith and Wizman [1990]. Asquith and Wizman [1990], in "Event Risk,
Covenants, and Bondholder Returns in Leveraged Buyouts (LBO)"15 examine the
relationship of certain covenants to bondholder/shareholder wealth transfers present in
corporate buyouts. Building on the evidence that bondholders suffer significant losses in
LBOs, Asquith and Wizman argue that some of the observable shareholders' gains are
attributable to bondholder losses. Their findings suggest that on average LBOs decrease
pre-buyout bondholders' wealth by 2.8%. Their paper also suggests that bondholder
losses are mitigated by covenant protection. Bonds containing certain covenants
protecting against increases in leverage or reductions in net worth experience significantly
smaller losses than do their unprotected counterparts. Asquith and Wizman further
demonstrate that wealth transfers from bondholders to shareholders explain only a small
fraction of the total stockholder gains experienced in LBOs.
1.4 Related Questions
The corporate bond parallel to SP CMBS placements is partially instructive. Yet it should
be noted that some corporate indentures do have a secured form often found in utilities'
14 Rule 144A refers to a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule allowing the sale of
unregistered securities among qualified institutional buyers. This rule is explained further
in the section on Public vs. Private Placements.
15Asquith, Paul and Wizman, Thierry, 1990, "Event Risk, Covenants, and Bondholder
Returns in Leveraged Buyouts," working paper #3173-90-EFA, Sloan School of
Management, M.I.T.
debt offerings. These indentures are most often floated for the funding of projects that are
backed by a specific asset--usually for the construction of that asset. This paper
recognizes the potential for expanding the analysis to include examples of covenants found
in this type of secured corporate debt.
How do the covenants in a secured corporate indenture agreements differ in function than
those in unsecured agreements? In secured debt, the bondholders have title to the pledged
assets until the notes are paid in full. Because of this pledge of assets, the bondholders of
secured debt are concerned with limiting the borrowers' rights of transfer and substitution.
This is partially confirmed by the detail and length of SP CMBS covenants dealing with
these concerns. Smith and Warner [1990] suggest that the "issuance of secured debt
lowers the total costs of borrowing by controlling the incentives for stockholders to take
projects which reduce the value of the firm; since bondholders hold title to the assets,
secured debt limits asset substitution."16  Further, secured debt seems to be more
frequently employed when the firm's assets are not specialized. "The more specialized the
assets, the more costly is asset substitution to stockholders, the tighter the implicit
constraint on asset sale, and thus the less likely is the use of secured debt."17
Lastly, how are the debt covenants of large conventional commercial mortgages different
from or similar to those of SP CMBS? Conventional commercial mortgage covenants
function with similar reasoning and intent to their SP CMBS counterparts. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that the differences in SP CMBS covenant form are created to facilitate
the multiple number of lenders that participate in a single SP CMBS deal. A single lender
tends negotiate very tight and specific covenants that in turn are more easily renegotiated.
16Smith, C.W. Jr., and Warner, J.B., Analysis of Bond Covenants, The Modern Theory of
Corporate Finance, McGraw-Hill Publishing, New York, 1990, p. 177.
17Smith and Warner, [1990], p. 178.
In contrast, SP CMBS covenants leave more room for borrower action, but are less easily
renegotiated as the number of lenders involved increases.
1.5 Summary of Research on Corporate Bonds
Bond covenants of corporate indentures can be grouped into four typologies:
production/investment, dividend, financing and bonding. The review of bond covenant
literature also reveals that corporate bonds show a difference in documentation between
public and private placements. The covenants of privately placed debt have more detailed
restrictions, and these agreements tend to be more easily and frequently renegotiated. The
research also shows that certain covenants can effect bond performance and value during
leveraged buyouts. Though this have no direct correlation to SP CMBS, the method of
focus on covenant protection for certain event risks is instructive.
CHAPTER 2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE CMBS MARKET
2.1 Overview
To understand the market for single-property commercial mortgage-backed securities (SP
CMBS), one must first look at the market for "pooled" commercial mortgage-backed
securities. SP CMBS is a specialty in the category of CMBS. This chapter first gives the
reader an overview of the economic and institutional constraints affecting the supply of
and demand for CMBS. Then, it examines two of the major participants in the issuance
and purchase of these securities.
2.2 Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities
The growth in recent years of the Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CM7BS)
market is the result of a number of factors. These factors are the 1986 Tax Reform Act
(TRA), Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) bulk sales, regulatory pressures on
commercial banks, risk-based capital requirements for life insurance companies and lower
interest rates. In concert with the above factors, the distressed real estate market of the
early 1990's created a supply of real estate needing new financing, and the liquidity and
bond-like characteristics of CMBS created a demand on the part of institutions that hold
real estate.
The commercial real estate boom of the 1980's was fueled by a prosperous economy,
preferential tax treatment for real estate and a newly deregulated financial services
industry that actively underwrote real estate loans in an environment of generally
increasing prices. In 1986, with the adoption of the TRA, the market for real estate began
to weaken. The TRA eliminated most of the tax benefits for holding real estate. This,
combined with over-building and over-leveraging of commercial properties, set the stage
for the collapse of the real estate market three to four years later.
Commercial real estate holdings were traditionally financed primarily through debt. As
much as 85% of the capitalization of any given property was in the form of intermediate-
term, fixed-rate loans from thrifts, banks or insurance companies. U. S. property markets
until the 1990's assumed that these traditional sources of capital were a permanent fixture
of real estate financing. This proved not to be the case. The "credit crunch" of the early
1990's was created by the exodus of these lenders from the market.
As real estate prices fell, individuals and institutions attempted to divest. Many investors
found that their commercial real estate -holdings had become illiquid, and in this
environment, obtaining refinancing for commercial properties became difficult. This shock
to the market was then followed by regulatory action in 1989 (The Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act--FIRREA). FIRREA set limits on nonresidential
commercial property lending and some additional limitations on multifamily lending.
CMBSs developed within this context as a means of bringing financing and liquidity to real
estate through the direct involvement of the capital markets.
The lion's share of the volume of CMBS issuance in the past three years has come from
agency sources 18. The Resolution Trust Corporation, created to liquidate government
owned property from failed savings and loans (S&Ls), has in recent years been the biggest
single source of commercial mortgages for securitization. In a sense, the RTC related
transactions have created the recently strong market for CMBS. In 1991 the RTC
18Agency refers to governmental sources of mortgage securities--FNMA, GNMA, FHLMC
and the RTC.
issuance of $2.5 billion accounted for 54% of that year's market total of $4.6 billion. RTC
volume in CMBS issuance peaked in 1992 at a total of $9.1 billion or 55% of the entire
CMBS the year's activity, and the volume in 1993 was 16% of a total market dollar
volume of $17.2 billion, or $2.8 billion.19
Non-agency borrowers and portfolio sellers have also accessed the capital markets to raise
funds through the issuance of CMBS. Efforts by investment banks to securitize large
commercial mortgages for single and pooled properties has resulted, in part, from the
sheer size of the commercial mortgage market. The current total market of nonresidential
commercial mortgages is believed to be about $700 billion. By the end of the second
quarter in 1993, approximately 2.7% of the $700 billion total had been securitized 20 , while
10.3% of the $291 billion in residential commercial mortgages had been securitized. 2 1
Nomura's mortgaged-backed securities re-search estimates that 30% of the existing
commercial mortgage debt will be seeking refinancing in the next 24 months. 22 Another
similar estimate is that of the current $700 billion in commercial mortgages, approximately
$140 billion must be refinanced in the next three years. 23
A recent Lehman Brothers presentation on CMBS transactions, indicates 40 CMBS deals
were completed in 1992, 129 in 1993 and 29 in the first quarter of 1994--with a projection
of 120-160 by the year's end. This translates into dollar volumes of approximately $16
19Kenneth Leventhal & Company, "Property Securitization Survey 1993," Presented at
CMBS Conference in New York, June 27-28, 1994, p.9 .20Federal Reserve Bulletin, "Mortgage Debt Outstanding," Table 1.54.
2 1 Commercial Mortgages (both non-residential and residential) comprise 8% of $12 trillion worth of
investments in the fixed income universe. The largest sector of the market is U.S. Treasuries which equal
40%, followed by home mortgages at 25%. Corporate bonds account for 17% of the universe, and state &
local bonds are 10%. (Federal Reserve, 1993 & JMB Institutional Investment Research, 1994.)
22Jacob, David P. and Duncan, Kimbell R., Mortgage Securities Research, Nomura
Securities International, January 1994, p. 5.
23An estimate made by Sheridan Schechner, Vice President, Goldman Sachs & Co. in his
presentation at the CMBS Conference in New York, June 1994.
billion, $18 billion and $23.5 billion (projection) respectively. 24 Specifically, in the single
asset transactions, $650 million were issued in 1992 and $2.0 billion in 1993.25 These
single asset transactions are most often used for regional mall financings, while some
transactions have been done for major downtown office properties. Exhibit 2.1 shows the
break down of total 1993 CMBS deals by product source.
Exhibit 2.1
Product Source Billions
Performing Existing Mortgages $8.1
Non-Performing Existing Mortgages $1.0
Conduit/New Origination $3.7
REIT Debt $2.0
Single Property CMBS $2.0
Credit Lease $1.6
*Lehman Brothers, 1994.
2.3 Major Participants in the CMBS Market
2.3.1 Insurance Companies. Since the late 1940s life insurance companies have been
the largest source of debt and equity capital for commercial real estate investments. The
previously mentioned early 1990s correction in the market triggered a high number of
24 Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities, Lehman Brothers, New York, April 1994, p. 2.25 Materials researched for this study indicate the1993 dollar volume of single asset
transactions to be $2.6 billion.
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delinquencies and foreclosures on assets in the real estate portfolios of these companies.
At the same time that losses were mounting, regulation changes affecting accounting
practices and risk-based capital requirements 26 made the holding of commercial real estate
loans more difficult.
Insurance companies, which have a mandatory risk-based capital factor of between 1.5%-
9% depending on the loan quality, have entered the CMBS market to remove some of
their exposure in carrying whole loans. Compared with a capital factor of 0.3% for
investment grade securities (AAA to A), the higher risk-based capital requirements for
whole mortgages have been a stimulus to securitizing of insurance company real estate
assets. The securitized mortgages are treated as bonds on the books of insurers and as a
result allow participation in the returns offered in real estate, but with lower capital
requirements.
A typical asset allocation for an insurer places approximately 50% of the total holdings
into equities, 40% into fixed income and 10% into real estate. Commercial mortgages
held in the real estate portion of the portfolio can be moved from the real estate holdings
to the fixed income holdings allocation through securitization. The senior classes of the
CMBS instrument are investment grade securities and can be characterized as a credit risk
exposure to the holder. In contrast, the subordinate classes pose a potential asset risk and
are considered to be more like an equity investment than a debt investment.
Risk-based capital requirements are established by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC). Legislation for life and health insurance companies has been
enacted into law on a state by state basis and is effective retroactively from January 1,
26Risked-Based Capital Standards are financial standards relating to the risks associated
with a particular business. These standards are used to establish the amount of capital to
run the business under consideration.
199327. For life insurance companies, the calculation for risk is based on four categories
of exposure:
. Asset default risk (Cl), representing the possible loss of
interest or principal on loans and the possible decline in price
or value of common stocks, property, or other investments;
. Insurance risk (C2), representing the potential that insurance
benefit claims will exceed actuarial estimates of claims for
policies issued;
. Interest rate risk (C3), representing potential losses from
asset liability term structure exposure to interest rate-sensitive
investments; and
. General business risk (C4), representing potential losses from
such events as litigation or changes in tax policy.
NAIC created the formula used to apply these areas of risk to a total risk-based capital
requirement. Different investment types carry varying levels of risks, or Risk Factors (RF)
in this formula. 28
Exhibit 2.2
NAIC Risk Factors (RF)
Stocks & Bonds RF Mortgages RF
Common Stock 30.07 Joint Ventures and
Preferred Stock 5.0% Limited Partnerships 20.0%
U S Government Bonds 0.0% Company Occupied and
AAA to A Bonds 0.3% Investment Property 10.0%
BBB to CCC 1-200 Foreclosed Property 15.0%
Bonds in--Near Default 30.0% Commercial Mortgages
In Good Standing 3.0%
In Delinquency 15.0%
In Foreclosure 20.0%
Non-insured Residential
Mortgages 0.5%
*Source: NAIC
2 7Similar risk-based capital requirements for property and casualty insurers in January
1994.
28Total risk-based capital= V(Cl + C3) 2 + C2 2 + C4
Because of the asset risk adjustment factors established by NAIC (See appendix) life
insurance companies have incentive to move out of higher-risk investments. The set-aside
for joint venture and limited partnership mortgages held by life companies is 20%.
Likewise, for company-occupied and investment property the set-aside mandated is 10%,
and commercial mortgages in good standing require 3%--15% in delinquency. Given that
the industry standard for its capital base is generally in close to 10% and that AAA to A
rated bonds have an adjustment factor of 0.3%, the trend toward securitization would
seem obvious for this sector.29
2.3.2 Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). REITs have also been a large player in
the CMBS debt market. Like REMICs (discussed earlier), the REIT is a creation of the
Internal Revenue Code. It is a company or trust, whose primary business is the owning,
management and development of properties. In addition the company has elected to
qualify under the tax code as a pass-through entity. A REIT must distribute 95% of its
earnings to its shareholders, and in addition the REIT pays no taxes at the corporate
level.30
For CMBS investors, REIT CMBS debt offers the most comparable secured debt
investment vehicle to corporate bonds. The publicly traded nature of a REIT means that
information on the equity component is available through the balance sheet and 10K filing
of the REIT. Further, the publicly traded stock of the REIT affords reporting by analysts
and research groups. There is speculation that as the REIT industry matures and is able to
achieve higher unsecured credit ratings from the agencies, their reliance on securitization
of mortgages may decrease in light of the current lower spreads over Treasuries on
corporate debt than CMBS. Yet if CMBS securities are being priced efficiently and if the
29Zinngrabe, Claude J., "Real Estate Investment by Insurance Companies--How Risk Based
Capital Requirements Affect It," Urban Land, March 1994, p. 42.
30Brueggeman and Fisher, [19931, p. 696.
ratings agencies properly evaluate the credit quality of individual REITs, then the spread
between these two debt securities should eventually converge. An efficient market should
recognize the same quality of debt offered in different formats.
In 1993 40 REITs filed Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) for a total of $8.5 billion. The
activity in this area had the effect of creating additional CMBS issuance activity. Two
billion dollars of 1993 CMBS debt came from 16 REITs. The spreads for fixed rate AAA
CMBSs issued by a REIT ranges from 90-110 basis points (bps), while AA fixed rate
offers between 105 and 130 bps.31
Typically, REITs have been participating in the CMBS market in conjunction with IPOs of
their stock. The combination of debt and equity offering provides an efficient mechanism
for the successful placement of each security. This "piggy-backing" allows potential
investors to evaluate the debt and equity components together. In addition, the
concurrent placements seem to provide an efficient means of marketing both instruments.
In the low interest rate environment of the early 1990's, the securitization of older and
higher interest rate commercial mortgages allows the REIT to increase its potential
income to shareholders. This makes the equity component of the issuing REIT more
attractive than it would be under the larger debt burden of the higher interest rate loans.
Thus when the debt payment reduction is accomplished just prior to the IPO, the pricing
of the equity offering can reflect the improved cash flow. This maximizes the amount of
proceeds to the REIT from the sale of the initial shares. In 1990 REIT transactions of this
nature accounted nearly 20% of the commercial mortgage securitizations completed.32
31Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities, Lehman Brothers, New York, April 1994, p.14 .
32Feinberg, Phyllis, "All Roads Lead to Wall Street," Real Estate Forum, May 1994, p. 33.
2.4 Summary
The market for CMBS is the result of a number of confluences in the real estate and
capital markets. As this chapter points out, the issuance of CMBS securities resulted from
a temporary though severe drop in traditional commercial mortgage lending. This exit
from the market by commercial lenders was brought about by a decline in value of
commercial real estate in the late 1980's. The decline in value was the result of two
primary factors: 1.) changes in federal tax policy relating to real estate investment and 2.)
an over-supply of "product" in the market. 33 As losses to institutional investors began to
mount, new banking and insurance regulations further reduced investor appetite for
commercial real estate.
The issuance of CMBS is the outgrowth of the capital market's intervention. CMBSs
permit investors to hold commercial real estate debt in a format that gives liquidity to
commercial property investments and that lowers risk-based capital requirements of
insurance companies--a major investor in commercial real estate.
We next look at the development of the single-property CMBS instrument. The
background contained in this chapter allows us to evaluate the context in which the
underwriting of single-property CMBS deals takes place. The severity of the early 1990's
recession in real estate made lenders and investors re-think requirements for new
investments. As a result, single-property CMBS indentures demonstrate these concerns in
their documentation and underwriting standards.
33These two condtions were exacerbated by the amount of leverage which was being utilized
in commercial real esta.
CHAPTER 3 SINGLE PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS
3.1 Overview
Single asset transactions have grown in prominence in the past two years. After having
considered the external forces acting on real estate and the market for CMiBS, we now
turn to an examination of how single-property securitizations work. Individual deals are
analyzed to determine costs of financing and the structures created for their issuance.
Specifically, two recent public single-property transactions are presented along with a
hypothetical deal which outlines the costs of a typical transaction. To provide context,
this chapter begins with a brief summary of the volume and type of SP CMBS transactions
to date.
3.2 SP CMBS Volume
Dollar volume of SP CMBS issuance peaked in 1990 and again in 1993 (see Exhibit 5.2).
The increase in volume of SP CMBS is attributable to the refinancing of projects that were
originally financed by thrifts, banks, pension funds and insurance companies. The first SP
CMBS were done for signature office properties such as Olympia & York's Maiden Lane
Finance Corp. issued in 1985 and American Express' 1985 placement of 11 5/8%
Guaranteed Notes secured by a subordinate leasehold mortgage on the American Express
Tower at the World Financial Center in New York. More recent issuances of SP CMBS
have been for regional mall financings. Securitization of these assets has proven to be
efficient as a source of capital for financing large transactions--$40 plus million in size.
The "technology" of CMBS pooled deals is applied to these single asset transactions. SP
CMBS issues use structure of the mortgage-backed securities typologies discussed in
chapter 1. The single-property facilitates the review of detailed information concerning
the underlying property, making investor analysis and due diligence easier than on large
pooled transactions.
SP CMBS financings also allow risk to be spread across several investors (lenders) rather
than be carried by one. Further, each investor is capable of better diversifying the same
dollar amount in relation to holding a conventional whole loan. Thus, in part, the capital
markets are facilitating the creation and sale of risk segmentation. Equally important to
the market's positive view of this instrument is the potential for liquidity provided to
investors of real estate. The secondary market for CMBS is developing based on investor
preference for a tradable debt security in real estate.
In doing these deals, Wall Street has taken advantage of the traditional lenders' recent
absence in real estate lending. The need for single-property financings is driven primarily
by the large number of balloon mortgages financed in the late 1980's that now require
refinancing. Low interest rates and minimal institutional lending in this area has further
reinforced the demand. Also spurring demand are the returns offered to investors in
comparison to other investments. For example, AA rated SP CMBSs with fixed rates of
interest offer an average of 105-115bps over Treasuries, as opposed to corporates which
average 45bps. 34 The recent rise in interest rates by the Federal Reserve Bank has created
the probability of accelerated demand to refinance while rates are still relatively low.
Single-property deals accounted for the largest number of CMBS transactions in both
1992 (15) and 1993 (27).
34Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities, Lehman Brothers, New York, April 1994, p. 22.
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*SOURCE: Kenneth Leventhal & Company, 1994
3.3 Hypothetical SP CMBS Issue
A hypothetical example demonstrates the feasibility of single asset transactions. For an
existing regional mall mortgage loan of $100 million35, two classes of bonds are issued--a
class A tranche with a rating of AA, and a class B tranche with a BBB rating. Loan-to-
Value for the senior class is assumed to be- 53% and for the subordinate class 62%. The
proposed Debt Service Coverage Ratios are 1.55 and 1.35 respectively. The spread on
the senior class ranges from 105-115 basis points (bps) above Treasuries for fixed rate and
75-85bps for floating rate. The equivalent in the subordinate class is a fixed rate of 190-
200bps and a floating rate of 170-180bps above treasuries. 36
Considerations in the issuance of this type of instrument include fixed vs. floating rate,
maturity (term of the mortgage vs. term of the bond--"tail period" 37), amortization,
prepayment provisions and public versus private placement. Exploring this imagined
transaction further one tabulates an all-in financing cost of 7.22% (see Exhibit 3.2). To
make this deal fully marketable in the floating rate scenario, the borrower would need to
35Assumes financing for the regional mall based upon the 7-year treasury.36Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities, Lehman Brothers, New York, April 1994, p. 22.37The mortgage securing a SP CMBS bond or note often has a maturity date prior to that of
the security. Because of this, investors look for what is called a tail period to be included in
the indenture. The tail period requires the borrower to secure refinancing of the mortgage
by a certain date or suffer a foreclosure on the property for liquidation. The proceeds of the
sale are used to payoff the bonds in a timely manner.
purchase an interest rate cap agreement to protect against interest rate exposure. An
additional provision of a "servicer advancing" clause in the servicer's contract is often
required by the market and the ratings agencies to insure continued interest payment in the
event of borrower default.
Exhibit 3.2
ALL-IN FINANCING COST*
Approximate Financing Costs Per Year
7-Year Treasury 5.68%
Indicative Spread 1.23%
Arnortized Issuance Costs 0.17%
Servicing & Liquidity 0.10%
Trustee & Rating Agency Annual Fee 0.04% ..............
TOTAL ALL-IN COST 7: .22%.....
SOURCE: CMBS, Lehman Brothers, New York, April 1994, p. 25.
The total issuance cost for this hypothetical $100 million regional mall financing is 92bps,
or $920,000. Added to this cost for the borrower are real estate expenses such as
appraisal, survey, title, engineering, environmental, legal and mortgage recording tax. The
underwriter also charges a structuring and issuance fee borne by the borrower. The result
of these costs is that financing done through securitization generally is competitive to
conventional financing above the $40 million mark mentioned above.
Going further with this hypothetical securitization, we can look at possible structure of
characters, relationships and cash flows. Between the borrower and the bond or
noteholders 38 are usually at least two other parties related to the transaction. The first is
the "issuer." The job of the issuer is to 1.) issue the notes and 2.) make and maintain the
mortgage loan to the borrower. The issuer is in fact an agent of the borrower who holds
all the stock in the issuer. As diagrammed in Exhibit 3.3.1, the mortgage and mortgage
38The term of the security is assumed to be five years--thus the instruments are refered to
here as notes rather than bonds.
notes flow through to the issuer to a trustee and then to the noteholders. In reverse, the
proceeds of the sale of securities go to the trustee and then flow through the issuer to the
borrower.
The trustee is in essence the mortgagee under the agreement. Its job is to hold the
mortgage in trust during the life of the securities. Included in the trustee's responsibilities
is the maintenance of the collateral and the administration of payments to the noteholders.
Some of this oversight is passed on by the trustee to "subcontractors." Yet, the
responsibility for these tasks still rests with the trustee.
Interest and principal payment on the notes are made directly to the trustee and then
released to the noteholders at the scheduled payment dates. This scenario also imagines a
LIBOR 39 indexed floating rate on the interest payments. As a consequence, the borrower
purchases an interest rate agreement from a counterparty (see Exhibit 3.3.2). When the
rate of interest on the notes exceeds the cap, the interest rate counterparty makes
payments equaling the difference between the cap and the current rate exceeding the cap
to the trustee. The trustee in turn passes these payments and the mortgage payments on
to the noteholders.
An additional role provided for in a SP CMBS indenture is the servicer. This job involves
the servicing and administering the mortgage loan on behalf of the trustee, and its role is
similar to that of the servicer in a conventional commercial mortgage loan. In addition,
some agreements direct that the servicer pay "advances" when the borrower does not meet
required payments of principal or interest. 40 The advances are then reimbursed out of
39London Interbank Offered Rate.
4 0The servicer is only required to make advances to the extent that it ascertains
reimbursement can be provided.
liquidation proceeds from the sale of the property. Most often the advances are coupled
with a "tail period" feature. 41
The description of characters and roles is typical of recent SP CMBS indentures and is
illustrated to give the reader a picture of a typical set of relationships contained in a single-
property securitization. The covenants frequently specify participants in the text, and
some covenants apply directly to these entities by limiting their actions. As an example,
later references to covenants of the issuer refer to the type of entity described above.
With this sketch of SP CMBS structure in mind, we now look briefly at the "Envelope"
and then examine two actual SP CMBS deals.
41Tail periods are covered in section 4.5.
Exhibit 3.342
3.3.1. Relationships between the noteholders, the trustee, the issuer, the borrower and the
interest rate agreement counterparty.
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3.3.2. Cash flow from the borrower and/or the interest rate agreement counterparty to the
holders of the securities.
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42SOURCE: Information Offering, Franklin Park Finance, Inc., Goldman Sachs
International Limited, April 30, 1992, p. 5.
3.4 The "Envelope"
For SP CMBS the borrower and its agent, the issuer, is most often a single purpose,
bankruptcy remote entity established for the creation of the indenture agreement. These
two characteristics--single purpose entity and bankruptcy remoteness--are significant
differences from the legal entity structure of the typical unsecured corporate indenture.
Also different is limited notion of the stockholder in SP CMBS. The equity in this type of
entity is held in the secured asset and by a limited number of individuals.
3.4.1 Single-Purpose Entities. The single purpose--single asset--entity or, "firm,"
created for SP CMBS agreements must hold no other assets other than the collateral, nor
engage in any other business other than the issuance of notes and the holding of the
property. This is a significant difference from the structure of a firm selling corporate
bonds as mentioned earlier. The vehicle usually employed to meet this requirement is the
Special Purpose Corporation (SPC). An example of the requirements of SPC entity is
found in the negative covenants of a recent SP CMBS description of the mortgage:
The Issuer will covenant that it will not (i) engage in any business other than
entering in to this transaction and owning, developing, managing, leasing,
maintaining, and operating the Property..., (ii) partition the property, (iii)
voluntarily file or consent to certain events of insolvency or
reorganization..., (iv) guarantee any obligations of any other person or
make advances or loans to any person, entities or affiliates..., (v) commingle
its assets with the assets of its affiliates or any other person, (vi) incur,
create or assume any indebtedness for money borrowed other than the Notes
or as expressly permitted by the Mortgage... (vii) transfer or lease the
Property or any interest in therein, except as permitted by the Mortgage43
The restrictions found in the above passage are intended to limit the issuer to business
activities to do with owning and operating this property. Restricting the "firm's" actions in
this manner protects the bondholder's claim by focusing the activities of management on
the productivity of the individual asset. As discussed earlier, this complete restriction of
43Offering Circular, Pacific Acquisition Corporation, Lehman Brothers, U.S. $65,000,000,
November 1993, p. 32.
activities is not typical of corporate indentures. The legal envelope of SP CMBS is
distinct in this regard.
The debt holder--equity holder conflict here is managed by the limited business actions
allowed to the "firm" and by the existence of the collateral which is in essence the equity in
the SP CMBS "firm". The directors of the single purpose entity, as a consequence, do not
face the same potential conflicts experienced by the management of a corporation with
outstanding debt and publicly traded equity 44.
3.4.2 Bankruptcy Remote Entities. The SPC classification allows the issuer to
"bankruptcy remote." Bankruptcy remoteness serves to protect the noteholders from
problems experienced by the parent or affiliate company of the borrower. Likewise, it
seems to also protect in the reverse. The borrower and its affiliate(s) are not liable for any
financial trouble experienced by the property. This feature is not typically found in
corporate debt agreements. The noteholders of corporate debt are invested in the financial
performance of the corporation which has many projects. This claim can be diluted or
devalued through actions unrelated to the bond issuance. Thus the covenant structure of a
corporate indenture agreement is intended to restrict actions by the firm, which may lower
the value of the debt, while still allowing new projects to be developed. The SP CMIBS
legal envelope forecloses the possibility of new business ventures by the borrower. 45
44The corporation is assumed to have many possible competing projects for investment--
some more risky than others and as a consequence more likely to reduce the value of the
noteholders' claim.
45The only exception to this complete restriction on new business activity is found in the
prospectuses allowing (planning for) substantial expansion to the property securing the
notes.
3.5 Sawgrass Finance, LLC
An actual example of a publicly placed regional mall financing utilizing SP CMBS is
Sawgrass Finance LLC, which issued $160 million in commercial mortgage pass-through
certificates in December 1993. The collateral for the notes is a four-part, non-recourse,
seven-year balloon mortgage on the 1.5 million square foot Sawgrass Mills Mall in
Sunrise, Florida. The borrower is the developer of the property and the lead manager on
the deal is Merrill Lynch in New York.
This SP CMBS issuance is interesting because of a simultaneously planned public offering
of stock by the mall's manager, the Mills Corp.--an affiliate of the Sunrise Mills LLP. The
Mills Corp. IPO was completed on April 15, 1994 at a price of $23.50 a share. After the
IPO, the company converted to a REIT which included the Sawgrass Mall as one of its
properties. The necessary SEC filing for the REIT IPO facilitated public placement of the
SP CMBS certificates.
Sawgrass Finance has four Classes of certificates ranging in rating from AAA to BB as
determined by S & P. The Class A tranche is $115 million of fixed rate notes with a
coupon rate of 6.45% and an initial dollar price of 101.01 plus. The Classes B, C and D
are floating rate notes tied to a spread over LIBOR. Their spreads are +85, +230 and
+430 respectively, and they are capped at 14% by an interest rate agreement purchased in
conjunction with the placement of the notes. As planned in the CMBS offering, after
successful consummation of the REIT transaction, a portion of the proceeds are to be
used to repurchase , the Class B, C and D certificates by the "Depositor" on or before
March 20, 1995. The repurchase is to happen on any one of the Distribution Dates at a
price of par plus any accrued interest.
The Sawgrass deal is also interesting for the multiple class structuring of the notes. The
multiple tranches are structured with stepped debt service coverage ratios matching their
respective levels of risk. At the date of issue these values were 2.97 for Class A, 2.82 for
Class B, 2.47 for Class C and 2.19 for Class D. For the three subordinate classes, these
debt service coverage ratios can fall as low as 2.5, 1.9 and 1.61 respectively for the 14%
capped interest rate environment. In addition, this deal has a provision for "Advancing" as
a part of the Servicer's responsibilities. Servicer Advancing benefits the certificate holders
in the case of foreclosure, and has become more prevalent in the past few years for deals
with multiple tranches. This feature is discussed further in the section concerning balloon
risk.
3.6 1211 Finance Corporation
1211 Finance is a notable example of an office building SP CMBS transaction--publicly
placed in November 1993. The total issuance of $155 million is for two classes of fixed
rate, collateralized notes secured by a mortgage loan which is in turn secured by a first
mortgage lien on 1211 Avenue of the Americas in New York. The property is a 45 story
Class A office building with 1.8 million square feet of leasable area and three major
tenants. Class A bonds for this issue carry a rating of AA with an interest rate of 6.736%
and a DSCR of 2.24. The Class B bonds are BBB rated and at 7.138%. Loan-to-values
for the two Classes are 46.8% and 55.4% respectively. The date of maturity for both
classes is November 1, 2003.
One of the strengths of the deal, as evaluated by Duff & Phelps, is the Class A status of
the building and its location in the best performing sub market of New York City.
Another strength identified is the building's 91% occupancy with 40% of the occupied
spaces under long-term leases to credit tenants.46 Combined with these qualitative
measures, are the strong DSCR and LTV values stated above and the inclusion of a
"Tail"47 mechanism in the agreement. Some measure of cash control is offered through
the establishment of a collateral account by the issuer in the name of the trustee for the
benefit of the noteholders. The borrower then deposits the monthly debt service into the
collateral account.
Due to the high percentage of lease turnover in the year 2000, the borrower is required to
establish two reserve accounts that are administered by the servicer and assigned to the
trustee as collateral for the notes. The first fund is the Capital Expenditure Reserve in the
amount of $20 million that is escrowed out of the proceeds to fund leasing costs and
capital improvements through 1995. The second is the Chase Releasing Reserve
consisting of $2.3 million funded annually out of the cash flow beginning in 1997 and
continuing for four consecutive years. This reserve is to cover leasing cost associated
with the expiration, in the year 2000, of Chase Manhattan's lease of 250,000 square feet
in the building.
Similar to Sawgrass Finance LLC, 1211 Finance Corporation is held as a REIT. 1211
Finance is the issuer of the notes under the agreement. These notes are collateralized by
the non-recourse mortgage loan secured by the office building. The property is owned by
1211 Acquisition Corporation whose shares are held by U.S. pension funds either directly
or through investment partnerships or trusts. This entity has elected to be treated as a
REIT for tax purposes. The REIT holds just the single property, and in that regard
461211 Finance Corporation, Duff & Phelps Credit Rating Co., Commercial Real Estate
Group, New York, 1994.
47The "Tail" provision mention here is explained in further detail under the section
pertaining to ballon risk.
different from the structure of the Mills Corp. REIT which holds Sawgrass Mills Mall as
one of several properties in the REIT.
3.7 The Ratings Process for SP CMBS
Rating agencies provide a third party independent review of real estate mortgage-backed
securities to establish creditworthiness of the issuer and the likelihood of principal
repayment. Ideally, a SP CMBS security with a rating of AA should be directly
comparable to a corporate or municipal security of the same rating. 48 The rating agencies
have come to demand certain restrictions of CMBS issues for them to receive investment
grade ratings. Specifically, the ratings agencies now look for lower loan-to-value (LTV),
higher debt service coverage ratios (DSCR), servicer advancing and tail periods. Early
CMBS documents, such as Water Street and Maiden Lane Finance, were crafted using
less restrictive criteria and as a consequence have been ineffective in safeguarding the
bondholder's value. The severe downgrading of these notes recently by the ratings
agencies has spurred a re-evaluation of the process.
Standard & Poor's, Fitch, Moody's and Duff & Phelps rate the bulk of single property
transactions. The ratings agencies' work with single property transactions mirrors, in
many respects, traditional real estate valuation techniques used by property owners.
Single property analysis by the rating agencies is divided into three components, real estate
quality, payment structure and legal issues.
Within the real estate analysis, the ratings agencies evaluate location, tenancy, leases,
history, management, construction quality, ownership position, insurance requirements,
48The offered yield spreads for SP CMBS remain higher than those for corporates due to the
presence of a perception in the market of a premium for real estate. this premium is the
result of investor momories of the recent recession in real estate. the second reason has to
do with the relative illiquidity of SP CMBS as compared to coporate bonds.
title insurance, environmental risks and subordinate debt. Not surprisingly these concerns
are found in either the representations and warranties or the covenants of SP CMBS
prospectuses.
Some recent and notable failures of this type of instrument has focused investor and
underwriter attention on these criteria. Two examples as rated by Standard & Poor's
serve to illustrate the reconsideration by the agencies. The first, Olympia & York Maiden
Lane Finance Corp., was originally issued in December of 1985 as AA rated, fixed rate
10.375% EURO notes secured by the mortgage on 59 Maiden Lane in New York--a one
million square foot office tower. The issue size was $200 million and due in 1995. At the
time of issue the appraised value of the property was $280 million. The notes have since
been downgraded several times by S & P. Their current rating is BB-.
The original AA rating was based on an evaluation of the then strong New York real
estate market, the perceived strength of the parent company and the existence of two
major tenants--Home Insurance and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Further
credit enhancement was provided by a $30.38 million credit insurance policy, to
supplement the rental cash flow in the early years, from Aetna Life & Casualty.49 Through
the course of the indenture, the issuer has also had to obtain additional Letters of Credit
(LOC) as collateral for the cash flow. Swiss Bank supplied a $14.8 million irrevocable
LOC which serves as collateral under the indenture agreement.
The downgrades have been due to S & P's view that refinancing of the bonds at maturity
in 1995 will prove to be difficult. In addition, the downgrade incorporates the concerns
for cash flow and liquidity problems experienced by the issuer's parent Olympia & York
Developments Ltd. (OYDL). S & P's negative view of refinancing stems from the fact
49Richards, [1987], p.137 .
that more than 72% of the property's cash flow comes from a single above-market-rate
lease. The major tenant, Home Insurance Co., is paying $55 per square foot for a 15 year
lease expiring in 1999. This rent level is double the fair market value for the area. Given
the probable dramatic decrease in cash flow after the lease term, uncertainty exists for the
refinancing. 50
The second example, Franklin Park Finance Inc., is a $30 million (up to $51 million)
collateralized variable rate and floating rate issue of Euronotes. S & P gave these notes a
rating of AAA for the original issue in 1992. The notes continue to receive this rating
based on the stable cash flow, historically high occupancy levels, and the perceived
competence of the management of the mall. The Euronotes are secured by an assignment
of a first mortgage and leases covering the non anchor owned portion of the Franklin Park
Mall in Toledo, Ohio. Franklin Park Mal Limited Partnership is a partnership, wholly
owned subsidiary of the Rouse Corporation.
The offering prospectus for Franklin Park states an initial maximum loan-to-value ratio for
the mortgage loan of 37.5%, based on the $80 million appraised market value of property
on the closing date. If the allowed expansion and further indebtedness takes place the
estimated appraised property value becomes $126 million. With the total allowable debt
increasing to $51 million, the projected loan-to-value ratio rises to 40.3%. Also stated is
minimum debt service coverage ratio of 1.7 for the initial offering of $31 million. This
ratio must be exceeded during the first three years of the indenture. During the remaining
two years this ratio is allowed to drop to 1.65.
50
"Commercial Mortgage Securities," Credit Review, Standard & Poor's, McGraw Hill, New
York, 1993, p. 46.
3.8 Summary
The agency evaluation of Franklin Park is an example of the conservative standards now
applied to SP CMBS underwriting and rating. The LTV and DSC ratios are intended to
provide a larger margin of safety against economic shocks to the retail property's value.
With the lower LTV and higher DSCR, the borrower has had to leave more equity in the
property than would have been necessary prior to the re-evaluation. As will be discussed
in chapter four, the evaluation of property performance is in large measure the evaluation
of default risk. Further, the risk of default for commercial mortgage loans is effected by
the standards applied to their underwriting. 51 The early 1990s recession in real estate has
made investors and underwriters more cautious, and as a result the criteria for rating
recent issues of SP CMBS reflect this caution.
51This correlation to underwriting standards is discussed in section 4.3.
CHAPTER 4 ADDITIONAL CONCERNS ABOUT SP CMBS
4.1 Overview
The previous chapter discussed some of the financial "engineering" aspects of SP CMBSs.
This chapter evaluates additional concerns and risks that must be considered in an
examination of the covenants effecting SP CMBS. These include type of placement,
expectation of a secondary market, default risk, balloon risk and real estate valuation.
4.2 Public Vs Private Placement
As discussed in Chapter 1, private debt in-corporate indentures is associated with more
detailed and restrictive covenants than those in the public counterparts. Contrary to this
expectation, the prospectuses examined in this study did not have significant differences
between public and private deals. The category of placement defined under Rule 144A of
the revised 1934 Securities Exchange Act has created a class of security that, though
private, resembles the public standards for documentation.
A traditional private placement is a non-underwritten security offering that is sold directly
to a single investor or a small group of investors. These private placements are exempt
from SEC registration requirements because they involve no public offering. Purchase of
these securities is limited to "sophisticated" well informed investors--usually institutions--
that generally disclose very little information about the transactions. The private market
serves the medium-sized corporate borrower. Larger corporations tend to utilize the
public markets, while smaller firms secure bank loans for their debt.52
Much of the real estate being securitized is owned by companies and partnerships that are
not publicly held and for whom the process of SEC filing is both costly and onerous. The
development of REITs in the past few years has placed more real estate into publicly held
and publicly traded entities suited to the requirements of public placements. The non-
agency CMBS market is nearly equally divided by public and private issuance. In 1993
47% of the CMBS deals were placed through the public market, while 53% were done
privately. 53 Yet the majority of placements for SP CMBS continue to be sold through the
private markets.
In contrast, public offerings are governed by SEC filing requirements for initial sale and
subsequent resale. A public filing of securities has costs associated with the SEC
registration process and requires disclosure of financial information. With large publicly
traded corporations this is usually not a problem. For smaller firms wanting to avoid the
expense and firms wishing not to disclose their financial positions, the public filing process
is usually avoided.
In April of 1990 the SEC adopted the use of Rule 144A. This set the stage for the
development of a new market for private debt that is very similar to the public bond
market. Rule 144A of the amended 1934 Securities Exchange Act qualifies the conditions
for resale of unregistered securities in the U.S. To be considered under Rule 144A, the
securities offered or resold must be done so to a qualified institutional buyer (QEB). The
definitions for entities qualifying as QIBs are found in the Rule and relate to the size and
52Carey, Mark S., and Prowse, Stephen D., "Recent Developments in the Market for
Privately Placed Debt," Federal Reserve Bulletin, February 1993, p. 78.
53Kenneth Leventhal & Company, [1994], p. 10.
type of a qualifying business. Any entity, acting for its own account or the accounts of
other QIEBs, that in the aggregate owns or invests at least S100 million in securities of non-
affiliated issuers generally qualify under Rule 144A.54
Securities that are acquired using Rule 144A are subsequently deemed to be "restricted
securities." Termed thus, they are then only able to be traded among other qualified
institutional buyers. Anecdotal evidence from individuals working in the CMBS market
suggests that most single property CMBS transactions are accomplished using this
procedure. This same anecdotal evidence further suggests that these privately placed
instruments are, by virtue of their Rule 144A classification, more liquid than true private
placements, yet are still purchased by investors looking for long term investments.
The SEC's reasons for adopting Rule 144Awere twofold. The first reason was to foster
liquidity in the market for private securities. The second was to allow a more integrated
participation by foreign investors and issuers in the U.S. debt securities market. Foreign
firms had, until Rule 144A, been infrequent users of U.S. public markets because they
found the registration process to be expensive and burdensome. The biggest problem in
this regard was the reconciliation of foreign accounting principles with those of the U.S.
In addition to the higher yields required in this market, overseas firms found that the
private market had terms and restrictive covenants that were unattractive. 55
As is evident in the study Sample, the majority of SP CMBS deals that have been issued in
the last three years were done so using Rule 144A. All the post-1990 private deals in the
sample are Rule 144A and the three deals from 1985-86 were Euromarket bond
placements. Three of the total study sampling were SEC filed public market deals.
54Rule 144A, Securities Act Rules, (Bulletin No. 148, 11-15-92), Bowne & Co., Inc.
55Carey and Prowse, [19931, p. 88.
Euromarket bond placements and sales done using Rule 144A are exempt from Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) filing requirements, yet are very closely crafted to
traditional public deals. The dominance of private/144A issues seems to be a result of the
lower issuance costs and liquidity associated with 144A placements.
Though this paper draws a distinction between private and public placements for SP
CMBS, it also recognizes the existence of Rule 144A has minimized the differences
between the public and private market. In the corporate bond markets, the existence of
Rule 144A has driven the terms and documents of "private" placement close to that of the
public market. 56 The similarity of covenants and documentation in the Sample indicates
that this homogenizing of the markets has also occurred for real estate securitization.
4.3 Secondary Markets
There can be no doubt that the early 1990's correction in the real estate market has
changed investor expectations for real estate. Renewed confidence in real estate
investment requires the ability to asses this investment class using standards of valuation
and trading similar to other investment vehicles. That is, like corporate bonds and
equities, real estate related debt and equity must be held, traded and sold in formats that
can easily be priced and that have liquidity.
The liquidity of a secondary market for CMBS bonds is dependent, in part, on the
standardization of underwriting and rating criteria for CMBS. Ratings agencies are
looking at the criteria used to evaluate SP CMBS properties to achieve consistent
standards from agency to agency. The desired result is for each agency to be able to apply
the same values for DCSR and LTV, etc. across deals. As a consequence, an investor
56 Carey and Prowse, [1993], p. 90.
should be able to evaluate and compare deals with similar ratings and be making an apples
to apples judgment of relative value.
The expectation of a secondary market also promotes the standardization of
documentation for SP CMBS prospectuses and memoranda. The examples included in
this study have high degree of similarity in the covenants of issues dating from the same
time period. This seems to support the trend toward development of secondary markets
for trading this type of security. One must still perform the due diligence on the individual
properties generating the cash flow, but standardization of documents facilitates
comparisons between securities.
4.4 Default Risk
Securitization of a mortgage on a single property allows several investors to absorb the
risk. Yet, unlike pooled securities which have the benefit of cross collateralization and
cross default, the SP CMBS depends on the performance of a single asset--most often an
office building or shopping mall. Like a conventional commercial mortgage, a single-
property security must take into account the risk of default for the one asset. Thus to fully
understand the functioning and intent of the SP CMBS covenants, one must consider
characteristics of default as demonstrated by the performance of commercial mortgages.
4.4.1 Commercial Mortgage Default Risk. Much of the research on commercial
mortgage lending focuses on default rates, and the source most often consulted for such
information is the American Council of Life Insurance (ACLI). The ACLI puts out a
quarterly report of commercial mortgage loan delinquencies, in-foreclosures, and
foreclosure rates based on records kept by insurance companies.
Utilizing the ACLI data, Snyderman [1994] "Update on Commercial Mortgage Defaults,"
examines the riskiness of commercial mortgages by tracking the lifetime default and
severity of loss for a sample of 10,995 loans. All loans in the sample are in excess of $1
million and are the product of eight originators. The study found a significant correlation
between lifetime default rates of a cohort and the cumulative subsequent five year change
in property value. When lifetime default rates are overlaid with five-year cumulative
property value changes an inverse relationship is evident. As property values fall, default
rates trend upward. 57
Lifetime default rates range from a low in 1977 of 6.7% to a high in 1982 of 19.6%. The
difference in performance is nearly three-fold. One obvious interpretation is that the
performance of commercial loans is highly dependent on the strength or weakness of the
regional economic outlook from the year--of origination. Also a possible factor is the
lending policy in practice when the loan is negotiated. This is likely to be affected by the
point in the economic cycle in which the loan is made. The implications of the Snyderman
study are that in certain periods commercial mortgage investments appear to present a
higher likelihood of loan default.
In a previous article, (Snyderman [1991]), he observes that the loans made just after the
1974-75 recession evidence lower rates of default than do their pre-recession cohorts. In
addition, this earlier study noted the tendency for loans originated in the early 70's and
'80's experience larger default rates in the first five years, while those originated in the late
70's have fewer defaults early and higher rates in their later years. 58 This study tracks
7,205 mortgages between 1972 and 1984.59
57Snyderman, Mark P., "Update on Commercial Mortgage Defaults," The Real Estate
Finance Journal, Summer 1994, p. 29.
58 Snyderman, Mark P., "Commercial Mortgages: Default Occurance and Estimated Yield
Impact," Journal of Portfolio Management, Fall 1991, p.85.
59This set of mortgages are included in the data base for the later [19941 study.
Snyderman's research is important to the investigation of covenants for two reasons. The
first is that default rates can be expected to increase as property values fall in a declining
market. For SP CMBS these findings are significant relative to the test requirement of
loan-to-value. Single property deals generally now require LTV ratios of 60% or less for
the senior class of notes. As an example, 1211 Finance had a LTV for the Class A notes
of 46.8% at the time of issue and a LTV of 55.4% in the subordinate tranche. This seems
intended to insure that the equity position in the collateral is sufficiently large to withstand
losses in value through cyclical downturns.
The second point that should be considered from this study is that the economic climate
and underwriting standards at the time of loan origination seem to effect rates of default.
By similar logic then, the same consideration may be true for single-property securities.
SP CMBS that have been issued since the down turn in the real estate market can be
expected to perform better with respect to default that those originated prior to and
several years after the market correction.
4.5 Balloon Risk
Securities backed by single property commercial mortgage balloon loans pose a unique
risk due to the potential inability of the borrower to obtain new financing. The risk that
refinancing will not be possible is known as "extension risk.' 60 This concern has received
renewed scrutiny recently in light of the credit crunch. Ratings for CMBS deals now
routinely take into account a projection of whether or not refinancing can be achieved
prior to the maturity date of the indenture.
60The risk of extension refers to the maturity date of the bonds. If refinancing cannot be
achieved on the correct time table, the investor suffers an extension of the time to maturity
for the bonds.
As evidenced in the downgrades experienced by the Maiden Lane Finance deal, significant
revaluation of the transaction occurs in the absence of a commitment for "take-out" loans.
Mitigation of the risk of extension has been somewhat offset by the inclusion in CMBS
transactions of "tail periods" and "servicer advancing" provisions. During the tail period
(a negotiable provision generally occurring six months to one year prior to the mortgage
maturity date) the borrower must demonstrate progress toward refinancing. Under this
scenario a refinancing commitment must be put in place by some date (typically six
months) before the date of maturity. If no commitment is found, the tail period allows
time for liquidation of the collateral to pay off bondholders.
Fitch Investors Service describes three scenarios
refinancing is at issue. These are given in Exhibit 4.1.
for transaction structures where
Exhibit 4.1
SINGLE-TRANCHE STRUCTURE
Simultaneous Mortgage and CMBS Maturity
Provide appraisal, phase I study, engineering Nin h o
report Mawi
Provide Commitment from Lender or Contract for SXN Mr
Sale Mtr
TAIL PERIOD WITH SERVICER ADVANCING
Mortgage maturity and "expected final" CMBS TatProdBgn
maturity
Servicer advancing allows workout or foreclosure DrnTa4erodN
and liquidation without default on CMBS ___________
CMBS maturity T 6Pw
*SOURCE: Fitch Investors Service, Inc. 1993
Multiple tranche structures require a modified solution to counter the problem of higher
rated tranches having the same risk of refinancing as their lower rated counterparts in the
same deal. The example that Fitch gives is of a deal with "AA" and "BBB" tranches that
-M I
are backed by a single balloon mortgage. When refinancing cannot be obtained, an
unacceptable situation is created. The "AA" tranche has the refinanceability level of the
"BBB."61 Without servicer advancing both tranches suffer the loss of interest during the
foreclosure and liquidation. Servicer advancing combined with a tail period ensures that
the AA rated tranche receives continued interest payments during foreclosure and
liquidation of the tail period. Principal repayment is then provided out of the liquidation
proceeds.
In the above situation the inclusion of a tail period does provide some benefit to the note
holders, but the tail period is best coupled with payment advances from an entity with
highly rated senior debt--in most cases the servicer. This advancing feature becomes
necessary in the event that the borrower, nearing foreclosure, stops payment or begins
bankruptcy filing. Though probably usefut-in the single tranche scenario, the measure is
critical to the rating of multiple tranche deals. The senior tranches in this case are then
insulated from the refinancing risks associated with the subordinate tranches.
4.6 Real Estate Valuation
The valuation of real estate assets is commonly determined by an appraisal method.
Methods of appraisal include the market approach, the cost approach and the income
approach. The market approach seeks to establish an asset value based on comparisons to
others having similar attributes and have recently sold. When using the cost approach, the
appraiser establishes a value for the site on which the improvement is located, then
determines the cost of reproducing the asset and adds the two together. The income
approach establishes a property value by determining how much an investor is willing to
pay for the income stream generated by the property.
61
"Commercial Mortgage Balloon Risk," 1993, Fitch Research--Special Report, Fitch
Investors Service, Inc., NY, p. 2.
An established income method of determining the value of commercial properties is
Derived Investment Value (DIV). DIV mirrors valuation principles used in corporate
investment. It is an income-based methodology used by the RTC to determine value,62
though it should be noted this method does not comply with the Appraisal Standards
Board guidelines, and therefore is not considered an appraisal. The method calculates the
net present value of cash flows generated by a property. The discount rates are dictated
by the classification of the asset into one of three categories. DIV classifies the asset as
real estate owned (ER), performing, or nonperforming. Based on these, the discounting
assumptions are then defined by one of three methodologies for DIV appraisal
corresponding to the classification.6 3
Choice of appraisal method clearly effects-the determination of a property's value. SP
CMBS mortgage covenants sometimes call for yearly appraisals of property value as a
check on the condition of the collateral. In addition, since covenants frequently require
the satisfaction of LTV ratios as a condition of additional financing or expansion, the
borrower and lender must agree on the method to be employed.
4.7 Summary
Each section in this chapter has focused on an aspect of SP CMBS which may affect the
structure of the indenture. If type placement of can effect the structure of covenants in
corporate bonds, (Kahan and Tuckman, [1993]), does the prevalence of Rule 144A affect
the covenants in SP CMBS? Further, is the expectation for secondary market trading of
6 2 Value is distinct from price which can be affected by forces external to the property and its cash flow.
6 3Quigg, Laura, "Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities," Lehman Brother Fixed Income
Research, December 1993, p. 41.
SP CMBS having an impact on standardization of indenture documents? Lastly, how do
the risks of default and extension impact the SP CMBS covenants?
CHAPTER 5 AN EXAMINATION OF THE COVENANTS
5.1 Overview
This chapter presents the function of covenants in SP CMBS indentures and then
examines the covenants exhibiting the greatest variation. The variations are compared
against attributes of the indenture which may affect the covenant under consideration.
These are placement type, date of issue, property type and the form of the security. The
chapter begins with a general discussion of the role covenants play in the mortgage-backed
securities. As a part of this presentation, the "option value" of covenants is proposed for
consideration in light of the limited variation encountered in the sample prospectuses. The
remainder of the chapter then looks in detail at the covenants.
5.2 The Function of SP CMBS Covenants
As demonstrated earlier, debt covenants in unsecured indenture agreements serve to
prevent the firm--which is not a single purpose entity--from taking actions which decrease
the value of the bondholder's position. In effect, in the absence of any collateral they
balance the potential conflicts between debt and equity investors. These conflicts focus on
the potential for wealth transfer between the two. Covenants in this type of indenture
agreement are restrictive with respect to the actions of both the management of the firm
and the collective group of shareholders. We now compare these functions to that of
covenants found in SP CMBS indentures.
Covenants in the SP CMBS documentation are intended to protect the bondholders from
improper actions by the borrower with respect to the operations and further financing of
the property. In a SP CMBS indenture, the equity holder (stockholders) and the borrower
are the same. Further, the equity is not held in the form of stock, but is instead present as
a portion of the total value of the property. The property's value is the sum of the
principal amount of the bonds and the equity interest6 4. Thus covenants in the indenture
function to protect the value of the principal while influencing the operations of the
property securing the mortgage. Their influence on the operation of the security is meant
to ensure sufficient cash flow to meet the obligation of the coupon payments.
The covenants restricting dividend payout and production/investment in corporate
unsecured debt are present in a modified form in SP CMBS issues. In SP CMIBS
indentures restrictions on dividend payout take the form of covenants concerning casualty
and condemnation. In the event of a casualty resulting in payment of insurance claims, the
covenants specify how the proceeds of the-claim must be applied either to restoration of
the property or prepayment of the outstanding principal balance. If the borrower were
allowed to retain the proceeds without restriction, the result would be equivalent to the
firm liquidating assets to pay dividends.
Production and investment covenants take the form of "negative" covenants in mortgages
securing SP CMBS indentures. These negatives restrict the borrowing entity from
engaging in business other than the securitization transaction and operation of the
property 65, guaranteeing other obligations, commingling of its assets with that of others
and voluntary filing for insolvency or reorganization.
Other negative covenants found in SP CMBS indentures are those of the issuer. These
restrictions include ones found above in the mortgage as well as limitations of the issuer in
64Described by the relationship- Value of Property = Principal + Equity6 5This is the function of the single purpose entity described in Chapter 3.
the purchase of stock or other investments and the issuance of additional securities-- unless
the proceeds are applied to the repayment of the already outstanding bonds. The only
exception to the investment restrictions seems to be the allowable purchase by the issuer
of its own stock and U.S. Treasury securities.
Similar to corporate bonds, some SP CMBS indentures require either the borrower or the
issuer to provide the trustee with yearly audited financial reports. The purpose of this type
of covenant follows the bondholder's interest in minimizing the costs associated with
monitoring the borrower. Smith and Warner [1990] refer to these as covenants
speciflying bonding activities of the firm.66
The last consideration before examining the function of SP CMBS covenants is how do
either the irrelevance hypothesis or the costly contracting hypothesis affect the
consideration of value of the SP CMBS firm. Because the SP CMBS firm is a single-
purpose entity with stockholders who are in fact one and the same with the borrower, the
conflicts between debt and equity holders are minimized. Further, the value of the firm in
this case is really the value of the property. If one values the property by a DIV method,
as mentioned in the previous chapter, that value is a function of the discounted cash flow
as it exists. As we saw, the application of a discount rate is determined by the property's
DIV classification.
Extending the logic of DIV valuation, two conditions can be delineated. The first is that
the overall value of the firm/property is unaffected by concerns for management of the
asset. 67 That is, the property is worth what it is worth and changing the management does
66Smith and Warner, [1990], p. 193.
67Management here is distict from concerns of maintenance. The manner in which a
property is managed may not increase the value of the asset, but can in fact decrease it
through neglect.
not increase nor decrease the value. Like the irrelevance hypothesis, this line of thought
implies that value of the firm/property is independent of the existence of covenants.
The second condition says that value is derived from the effective management of the
property and its cash flow. As will be seen in the discussion of the covenants, certain
provisions of the indenture are aimed at controlling the management of the property. This
suggests that SP CMBS bondholders attribute a portion of the property's value to the
effective management of the secured asset. Moreover, as with the costly contracting
hypothesis, this view of SP CMBS covenants says that the value of the property is
increased by the presence of the covenants.
5.2.1 Three Functions. With these two conditions in mind, we next examining the
functions of SP CMBS covenants. Three essential functions can be identified. They are
stated in the following three points and then summarized below in Exhibit 5. 1:
Exhibit 5.1
Function of SP CMBS Covenants
1. Maintenance of the secured collateral value of the property to
offer bondholders assurance of principal repayment.
2. Control of the operating value of the collateral to facilitate
the timely and complete payment of coupons to the
bondholders.
3. Prevention of competing claims on the collateral.
1. Principal Repayment. The investor in SP CMBS bonds is concerned with the
ability of the borrower to repay the principal on the certificates at the date of
maturity. This principal repayment is achieved either by borrower refinancing or
through the forced sale of the property by the trustee. Ability to repay principal
can be affected by overall market forces or through borrower neglect of the asset.
The covenants seek most directly to control the latter by requiring proper
management, maintenance and leasing of the property. Market forces are
accounted for in two ways. a) The loan-to-value ratio is established at a
conservative level so that in the case of liquidation the total principal amount of the
notes can be recovered--even during a difficult market for real estate. b) The
presence of a tail period forces the borrower to obtain refinancing commitments
six months to one year prior to the loan maturity date. If this cannot be
accomplished the servicer or trustee-then has the right to foreclose and sell the
property to repay the bonds.
2. Operating Value. The SP CMBS bondholder has recourse to the mortgage on
the asset (building/property) in case of default. Covenants for this type of debt
instrument exist partially to protect bondholders interest in decisions affecting the
operating value of the collateral. The SP CMBS corporation has by design no
assets or business function other than that of the owning and operation of the
collateral 68. This value is greatly diminished when its income producing capacity is
not effectively managed. Since there are no other income activities of the SP
CMBS entity its ability to make payments on the bonds derives directly from the
successful management of the property.
68As such, the SP CMBS "firm" is a single-asset, single-purpose entity. This is discussed in
the section on the "Envelope."
3. Competing Claims. Lastly, the SP CMBS covenants require that additional
financing be restricted and that no liens should exist that are senior to the
outstanding notes. This third function of the covenants is meant to ensure the
senior position of the bonds to any competing claims. To this end, the covenants
further require that no subordinate liens can remain unresolved longer than a
stipulated time period. Cure of additional liens is important to insure that in the
case of bankruptcy the bondholder's lien on the mortgage will not be diluted by
unsecured liens of creditors.
5.2.3 Option Value. Each covenant can be thought of as an option purchased or sold by
either party--borrower or lender. Both parties must "price" the particular covenant into
the documentation in terms of opportunities provided or restricted. While the thesis does
not suggest a model for quantifying these-potential factors of pricing, it does outline the
crucial covenants affecting the performance of the notes. In as much as the SP CMBS
documentation has increased in its standardization, any variation in the boilerplate must be
considered for its option value, and the option value of the altered covenant either accrues
to the borrower or the bondholder.
Exhibit 5.2
BORROWER VS LENDER PAYOFF
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Exhibit 5.2 (continued)
Three Conditions of the Securitv
V < P = Principal
D<P
E>0
The two diagrams and the T-account in Exhibit 5.2 above serve to demonstrate the stakes
at hand in the evaluation of the role of covenants in a SP CMBS indenture. The
borrower's payoff exists while the equity component of the property remains positive.
Below the Principal (P) the value to the borrower becomes zero. From the lender or
investor point of view, retention of the full value of the debt position depends on the
relationship of V > P. When V < P, the lender looses while the borrower becomes
indifferent at the value of P and below. The diagrams also demonstrate that in SP CMIBS
the equity in the asset serves as the primary credit support for the bonds.
Associated with One State. The covenants are present to protect the lender's claim
relative to these possible states of value for the property securing the notes. By assigning
each covenant a role relative to these two conditions, one can make a determination of
which state of the property's value the covenant serves to protect. As an example,
covenants requiring the insurance of the property while the notes are outstanding are
clearly guarding the value of the borrower's claim to the principal. Specific covenants to
on the management of the property seem designed to ensure sufficient cash flow to afford
timely and complete payment of interest on the notes. As such they are protecting the
operating value of the property and by extension the equity. As the operating value
decreases, the first loss is usually to the equity component.
Debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) 69 and loan-to-value (LTV) 70 ratios correspond
roughly to two concerns of the investor--interest payment and principal repayment. The
operating value of the property is a cash flow concern and as such uses the DSCR as a
measure of sufficiency income for servicing the debt. While the liquidation value (or
ability to refinance) is concerned with the principal repayment at maturity of the bonds.
Principal repayment is accomplished either by refinancing of the mortgage loan or
liquidation of the asset. In either scenario the property must have a LTV which allows
recovery of the principal plus transaction costs associated with the recovery.
Associated with Two States. If a covenant can be associated with both of the two
conditions above it has a greater likelihood of employing more specific and restrictive
language than when it applies to just one. Covenants of transfer, casualty/condemnation,
additional indebtedness and expansion are examples that protect both measures. Because
of this, the covenants are detailed in their provisions for all possible scenarios. The
analysis of individual covenants addresses this observation further.
The considerations of covenant function and value are now applied to an evaluation of the
actual SP CMBS documents. To do this, we first look at the characteristics of the
"sample."
69DSCR is defined as the ratio of Net Operating Income to the mortgage (debt) payment.70LTV is the ratio of the principal amount of the bonds (or loan) to the value of the property.
Valuation of the property is discussed in section 4.6.
5.3 The Study Sample
The conclusions in the study are based on a sampling of 17 SP CMBS prospectuses and
memoranda from 1985 to mid-1994 (the "Sample"). The total issuance of single-property
securitizations to date consists of 73 placements (see Appendix B). Prospectuses and
memoranda used for this study were obtained from the investment banks underwriting the
deals as well as from advisory firms involved in the management of the securitized
properties. The Sample contains 14 deals from 1992 to 1994 and three deals from 1985.
It is interesting to note that the 1985 sample contains 80% of the total dollar volume for
that year.
Exhibit 5.3
Volume of SP CMBS Issuance
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The dollar volume of issuance for SP CMBS fluctuates during the period under
consideration, with the 1993 volume peaking at $2.6 billion. (See Exhibit 5.3). A
previous peak in dollar volume issuance occurs in 1990--with $1.8 billion. The interim
years average a total issuance of $790 million. Median and mean dollar volume values for
1985 and 1986 transactions are the highest and consist of a few large deals (Exhibit 5.4).
In contrast, 1992 and 1993 median and mean values are less than half and are
characterized by a larger number of smaller transactions. Excluding the dollar size of
deals in 1985 and 1986, the average size of SP CMBS deals done since 1986 is S113
million.
Exhibit 5.4
Median and Mean Values Per Year
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5.4 Method of Analysis
The analysis of the covenants is a two-fold exercise--first is a quantitative break-down of
the type and frequency of occurrence for individual covenants, second is a qualitative
review of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the covenant's permutations. The
passages describing the individual covenants have been entered into a data base which
allows comparisons of the same type of covenant across many deals. To facilitate the
comparisons, the most frequently observed covenants are "outlined." For example,
covenants of additional indebtedness are formatted into a single spread sheet containing
attributes of the issue as well as specific restrictions and conditions of the covenant. This
allows direct comparisons between the 17 indentures. Exhibit 5.5 on the following page
shows some of the attributes of the Sample.
Exhibit 5.5
SP CMBS Sample Characteristics
# Prop. Amount Issued Placement Securit Comments
1 Office $151,679,000 05/85 EURO Guaranteed Notes Pre-Rule 144A
2 Office $200,000,000 12/85 EURO Secured Notes Pre-Rule 144A
3 Office S 160,000,000 12/85 EURO Secured Notes Pre-Rule 144A
4 Mall $51,000,000 04/92 EURO/144A Collateralized VRNs & FRNs
5 Mall $90,000,000 07/92 EURO/144A Collateralized VRNs & FRNs
6 Mall S62,000,000 12/92 144A Collateralized FRNs
7 Mall $41,000,000 02/93 EURO/144A Collateralized FRNs
8 Mall $57,500,000 03/93 EURO/144A Collateralized FRNs
9 Casino $330,000,000 06/93 Public Guaranteed Mortgage Notes
10 Mall S 118,000,000 08/93 EURO/144A Collateralized FRNs REIT
I I Mall S140,000,000 10/93 EURO/144A Collateralized FRNs REIT
12 Mall $65,000,000 11/93 EURO/144A Mortgage Collateralized Notes REIT
13 Office S 155,000,000 11/93 Public Mortgage Collateralized Notes REIT/REMIC
14 Mall $160,000,000 12/93 Public Pass-Through Certificates REIT/REMIC
15 Mall $51,500,000 02/94 144A Mortgage Notes
16 Mall $58,000,000 04/94 144A Pass-Through Certificates REMIC
17 Mall S152,000,000 03/94 EURO/144A Pass-Through Certificates REMIC
DEFINITION OF TERMS:
# Prospectus/Memorandum
Property Type of real estate asset securing the mortgage.
Amount Total dollar amount of the offering.
Issued Date of prospectus or issue of securities.
Placement Means by which the notes were sold to the public.
Security Type of mortgage-backed instrument involved.
Comments Other defining characteristics of the issue.
The first analysis performed is the creation of a simple matrix of covenant types and deals.
Each type of covenant has been assigned a "1" or "0" as being either present or not
present respectively in the documentation of the prospectus (see Appendix C). The deals
have been arranged chronologically and denoted by public, Eurobond (EURO) or 144A 71
designations. The resulting tabulation of this exercise is then used to determine which of
the covenant types should be examined in detail using the outline format. Where test
restrictions appear as ratios or dollar amounts, these have been included to aid in the
comparisons. The function of less frequently occurring covenants are also discussed. The
last component of the analysis looks at covenant-like restrictions in the documents such as
provisions for "lockedboxes" and reserve accounts.
5.2.2. Frequently Occurring Covenants. A first pass at the Sample shows the
covenants that appear most often in the.-seventeen indentures. Three categories of
covenants have been identified: 1.) those relating to the issuer, 2.) covenants contained in
the mortgage and 3.) in one prospectus, covenants of the indenture itself. Covenants that
appear most frequently are listed below in Exhibit 5.6.
Exhibit 5.6
Frequently Occurring SP CMBS Covenants #/Sample
Covenants of the Issuer
Restrictions on Guarantees 10/17
Restrictions on Engaging in Other Business 10/17
Restrictions on Further Indebtedness 10/17
Covenants of the Mortgage
Maintenance of Insurance 17/17
Restrictions on Additional Indebtedness 14/17
Restrictions on Alterations 16/17
71 Public refers to any issue that is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) as required by the Securities Act of 1933. Eurobond is the designation used for
securities offered in the European market, and 144A is a reference to a method of bond
placement and trading done in the private market between Qualified Institutional Buyers,
as allowed under the SEC rule of the same name.
Exhibit: 5.6 (continued)
Maintenance of the Property 16/17
Restrictions on Transfers 15/17
Condemnation Provisions 17/17
Events of Default 16/17
Non-Recourse 16/17
Restrictions on Engaging in Other Business 11/17
Restrictions on the Commingling of Assets 11/17
Less frequently occurring covenants are discussed later in the paper. These include
covenants on the right to expand and contract the property, permitted additional
financing 72, substitution and defeasance and escrow accounts for capital expenditures.
The covenants showing the greatest variation are the provisions for expansion and
alteration, condemnation, and special maintenance. While the most generic and least
varied are those dealing with insurance, discharge of liens, leases, and title insurance.
Covenants naming specific property management firms are also found. The frequency of
occurrence for all the covenants is shown in Exhibit 5.7.
72This is distinct from covenants concerning Additional Indebtedness.
Exhibit 5.773
Covenants of the Issuer
Number of Prospectuses with Covenant
0 2 4 6 8 10
Guarantees 10
Other Business 10
Indebtedness 10
Investments 9
Acce eration
Bankruptcy
Securities3
Transfer 3
Covenants of the Mortgage
Number of Prospectuses with Covenant
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
RE Taxes 18
Insurance 17
Compi ance 10
Discharge of Liens 12
Indebtedness 14
Easements -
Alterations 16
----- ,-----,--
Leasing 0
Maintenance 16
Management
Special Maintenance 9
Transfers 15
Casualty -3
Condemnation 17
Default 16
Modification
Title Insurance
Defeasance - 6
Financial Statements - 8
Non-Recourse - 16
73 The tabulation of covenants is found in Appendix D. Not shown in these two graphs are
negative covenants of the mortgage and covenants of the indenture.
5.5 A Detailed look at the Covenants
We now focus our attention to the examination of the individual covenants for their roles
in the indenture and in the course of the bond's issuance. Each covenant is defined, its
role in the document is discussed and comparisons are made across the various
prospectuses in the Sample. In addition, some covenants are compared to those in
unsecured corporate indentures. Exhibit 5.7 on the preceding page gives the reader an
overview of the frequency and range of covenants in the SP CMBS indentures.
5.5.1 Transfers. Transfer is a critical covenant for investors in SP CMBS. An investor
wants to have the confidence that a change in ownership of the collateral will not have a
material adverse effect on the property and the rating of the indenture. Because of this
concern, both the rating agencies and potential investors look very closely at the
restrictions for transfer of ownership and control. For most SP CMBS agreements, the
borrowers are only allowed to transfer their interests in the property between themselves
or a related party. Sale to a third party is restricted to entities which, through their
ownership of the property, would not cause a downgrading of the notes. Tests such as net
worth, aggregate total assets and asset management credentials are applied to
requirements for transfer.
Analysis. The entity to which transfer is to be made must have the same legal envelope as
the current borrower. This requires a single purpose entity that is bankruptcy remote from
any affiliates. Affiliates are meant to have a current net worth of at least $100 million and
total assets of at least $200 million. This net worth test can also be established by an
entity with a current debt rating of the highest rating of the current outstanding notes.
These conditions of transfer seem to be modeled on the Rule 144A qualifications for
institutional buyers (QIBs). The reasoning for this similarity is to ensure a depth of
resources and investing knowledge on the part of any new owner. An investor in the
mortgage notes then has the assurance that a transfer will not result in a loss of value in
the property through ownership by a less substantial entity.
Most of the indentures provide for permitted owners which are allowed to assume control
or ownership of the property without the mortgagee's consent. These provisions are
highly specific and frequently name affiliates of the borrower or the management company,
or its affiliates. Though the intent is similar, the conditions of this portion of the transfer
covenant is tailored by the circumstances of the borrower and real estate advisor/manager.
This specificity does not seem to show a correlation to either placement type or asset type.
Transfer provisions represent a significant restriction to the borrower. Yet informal
evidence indicates that SP CMBS provisions for transfer are actually less restrictive than
those of conventional commercial mortgage lending agreements. Commercial mortgages
usually require the borrower to negotiate any planned transfer and often include penalties
associated with transfer or prepayment. The SP CMBS borrower has, in this sense,
purchased a valuable option.
5.5.2 Additional Indebtedness. Indebtedness of the borrower is limited in all of the
Sample SP CMBS agreements dating from 1992 to 1994. In contrast, the 1985 American
Express Company indenture contains no provisions against further indebtedness (see
Appendix D, Exhibit 3). The notes of this indenture are secured by a subordinate
mortgage. As stated in the documents, "The Subordinate Mortgage will not contain any
restriction on the Mortgagors' right to sell, assign, convey, transfer, mortgage or
otherwise dispose of any of their respective interests in the Property."7 4 In the majority of
the documents, borrowers are restricted in both using the property to secure other loan
commitments or in adding more debt to the collateral. To the extent that the borrower is
allowed to finance projects of benefit to the maintenance and marketing of the asset, the
covenants usually stipulate a maximum dollar amount permitted without the consent of the
bondholders. This number is shown most often to be 5% of the total issuance of debt in
the offering. If the borrower wishes to exceed this threshold amount, consent must be
given by either the bondholders or the trustee.
Some specific exceptions to this standard are observed in prospectuses providing for
planned expansions to the property. The study found examples of both anticipated
subordinate and pari passu financing arrangements. These agreements required test ratios
be met as a condition of the supplemental financing. Without a specific
expansion/alteration plan included in the indenture, the borrower gives up an ability to
easily respond to changes in the market place. This covenant would seem to most
severely restrict retail property borrowers to react to charges in the market.
Analysis. The bondholders' claim in the secured indenture can be diluted in several ways.
The most obvious is the issuance of additional notes with a claim senior to the original
amount. In this instance, the bondholder's priority in the security is lost to the new group
of bondholders who also have first priority over the cash flow. This scenario is excluded
from the borrower's possible actions in all but one of the documents.
Subordinated secured and unsecured debt is tightly restricted in all the documents with
covenants concerning additional indebtedness. In most examples, the borrower covenants
74 Offering Memorandum, American Express Company, U.S. $151,679,000, May 30, 1985,
p.28.
that it will not incur additional debt without the trustee's or mortgagee's permission. After
this blanket statement of required approval, the covenant then elaborates the allowable
exceptions. The boilerplate test for allowance of additional unsecured debt is that it be
incurred during the normal course of business in managing the property. This includes the
financing of capital improvements and tenant fit-out. The dollar amount generally allowed
is the 5% of the principal amount of the mortgage notes.
Other tests of the additional debt include evidence through written agreement that the
terms of supplemental financing are not more favorable than can be negotiated at an arm's
length transaction; the additional debt amount together with principal balance of the
mortgage notes does not exceed 80% of the property value; and the debt is evidenced by
a written agreement that provides additional debt be allowed only to the extent that net
operating income (NOI) is available after paying amounts due on all other indebtedness of
the borrower. Test DSCRs and LTVs are also required in some cases.
"Threshold Amounts" for SP CMBS operate as a part of the additional indebtedness
restrictions. The reasoning behind the establishment of thresholds would seem to be a
function a maximum DSCR and LTV acceptable to the ratings agencies for the class of
notes offered. The pattern to the establishment of threshold amount indicates a
convergence toward the standard of 5% mentioned above. Most directly, the existence of
threshold permitted additional indebtedness indicates the design of "slack" in the LTV and
DSCR values applied to the performance criteria. In a concept similar to that for free cash
flow in corporations, SP CMBS entities are set up to give the borrower a limited (though
judged sufficient) means for reacting to changes in the retail/office market.
The Sample contains one indenture with a separate provision for permitted supplemental
financing to be created pari passu to mortgage notes. The issue is a four tranche structure
with an original dollar amount of $152 million. The B, C and D tranches of this deal
become subordinate to the additional financing once it has been put in place. "Permitted
Supplemental Financing" is included in the mortgage as a separate covenant. Constraints
to this additional financing are a DSCR greater than 1.3 to 1 and no continuing mortgage
event of default. Satisfying these conditions, the mortgagor may then issue additional
mortgage indebtedness of up to $15 million which is designed to rank pari passu relative
to the Class A notes.
Concern in over inappropriate actions by management requires corporate indenture
agreements to limit debt by the borrower thereby encumbering some of management's
freedom to make decisions concerning the firm's actions. Likewise, by limiting further
encumbrances of the property, SP CMBS covenants on additional indebtedness are
designed to ensure that sufficient cash flow remain available to service the payments on
the notes, and to protect the first lien position held by the mortgage notes.
Though covenants for additional indebtedness are detailed in their conditions of restriction
and allowance, this study finds negligible observable difference between public and private
placements or between the two principal asset types in the Sample--regional malls and
office buildings. The variance of restriction seems to be a function of when the indenture
agreements were completed. Indentures issued recently exhibit the most restrictive and
specific language concerning indebtedness. In addition, these agreements differ from
earlier ones by requiring within the covenant that no mortgage event of default can be
occurring when additional indebtedness is sought. This apparent change in underwriting
standards, occurring late in 1993, is most likely an outgrowth of the losses that occurred
in real estate markets in the early 1990s.
5.5.3 Casualty and Condemnation. Casualty, condemnation and partial condemnation
are concerned with the principal repayment to the bondholders in case of damage to the
property securing the mortgage. Recalling the earlier debt and equity payoff diagrams, the
provisions for casualty are meant to ensure that the order of payment requires payoff first
of the debt component before the borrower receives any of its equity interest. This
provision has no precise counterpart in unsecured corporate debt indentures. The closest
analogy to corporate indenture covenants is found in the restrictions on the payment of
dividends. Under these restrictions, the distribution of payments to the equity holders of a
corporation are limited through covenants. Since the receipt of insurance from a casualty
claim represents funds necessary for reinvestment in the productivity of the asset, proper
application of the proceeds becomes equivalent to reinvestment in the firm. If those funds
are not reinvested, the SP CMBS "firm" is essentially making a dividend payment of the
assets of the firm. As a result, decreases the equity component of the property's value and
making the bondholder's claim more susceptible to loss.
Analysis. The covenants of casualty and condemnation found in the Sample reveal some
differences in provisions for trustee 75 control of insurance proceeds and in the stated dollar
amount of the threshold (see Appendix D, Exhibit 4). Trustee control of funds from
insurance claims focuses on the size of the claim. Four of the 17 indentures give the
trustee control of any insurance proceeds from casualty or condemnation. They are the
most restrictive of the borrower's actions. Seven indentures require trustee control of any
proceeds greater that the stated threshold amount. Similarly to thresholds for additional
indebtedness, thresholds for trustee control in cases of casualty converge on the 5%
figure. Some exceptions to this number exist, and in all but one these differing deals, the
thresholds are a lower percentage of the outstanding principal balance.
75 Trustee here is meant as a general term for the intermediary between borrower and
noteholders. In some cases the indenture name the mortgagee as the entity in charge of
insurance proceeds.
All of the agreements allow the prepayment of principal without penalty or premium
through the application of the insurance proceeds. 76 In the event that the borrower is
obligated or chooses to restore the property and there is an excess of proceeds after
restoration, all but one of the indentures requires the borrower to apply the remainder to
the repayment of the notes. The exception is a recent issue giving the borrower, in certain
circumstances, the right to retain excess proceeds after restoring the property to its
original condition, or to repay the mortgage note in full, with a prepayment premium.
....If the nature of the casualty is such that (a) the Mortgagor is
excused under all leases and the Reciprocal Easement
Agreement from restoration responsibility, and the schedule for
restoration of the Property indicates that work having a cost in
excess of the Threshold Amount cannot be completed prior to the
date on which business interruption or rental loss insurance
would be exhausted, then the Mortgagor must prepay the
Mortgage Note in full at a price of par plus accrued interest,
without Prepayment Premium, and all other amounts due under
the Mortgage. If the Mortgagor is not required to repay the
Mortgage Note as provided in the preceding sentence, it may
elect either to (i) restore the affected premises as nearly as
practical to at least its fair market value, utility and character
immediately prior to such damage (and in the case of it doing
so, retain any excess Proceeds, if such restoration can be
completed for less than the total Proceeds) or (ii) prepay the
Mortgage Note in full, with Prepayment Premium, and all other
amounts due under the Mortgage.77
The permission to retain excess restoration proceeds constitutes a negative incentive to
the borrower relative to the bondholder's claim.
76This is conditional on the borrower not being required by any lease or obligation to restore
or any provision of the covenant which may impose the general obligation of restoration.
Some of the examples allow the borrower latitude below the threshold amount.
770ffering Memorandum, Freemall Finance, Inc., Morgan Stanley & Co., U.S. $152,000,000,
March 1994, p. 61.
As with the covenants for additional indebtedness, the covenants for casualty and
condemnation have begun to include a provision that no event of default shall have
occurred or be occurring when insurance proceeds are given to the borrower. This
correlates to recent indentures in both instances.
5.5.4 Alterations. Covenants restricting the borrower's rights to alter or make
improvement to the property are primary concerned with the changes in the property to do
with normal up-keep and tenant fit-out. All of the indentures limit rights in this area. The
most frequently employed provision is capping the permitted total cost of alterations plus
any outstanding liens at 5% of the current principal value of the notes outstanding--
referred to as a threshold amount. Other means of restricting alterations are through
placement of a cap on allowable square footage for alteration, test ratios and rated
collateral for renovations in excess of the threshold amount (see Appendix D, Exhibit: 1)
Analysis. Covenant concerns over alterations to the property securing the mortgage are
focused on the preservation of market value and limitation of additional debt. In this
sense, they are limitations on the borrower's ability to make investments (therefore
changes) in the secured asset. Eleven of sixteen indentures with provisions for alterations,
provide for a 5% cap, or threshold amount, on the estimated cost of constructing
alterations. There is no evident correlation to property type or to placement method.
Varying from this benchmark is one mall allowing a threshold amount of 8%, while three
other mall properties had thresholds at or below 2.5%. The Trump casino mortgage notes
had no covenant restrictions on alterations, though this indenture highly restricts the
partnership as to additional indebtedness, dividend payouts and limitations on liens.
All of the 16 indentures limiting alterations required verification that the planned
alterations will have no "material adverse" effect on the "fair market value." Six of the 16
had the stipulation that no mortgage event of default could being occurring at the time of
the alterations or their planning. This default provision trend occurs in more recent
indentures. Other provisions of alterations covenants include requirements for security
above the threshold amount, a proscribed rating for this security and the supervision by an
independent architect for changes which exceed the threshold.
5.5.5 Maintenance/ Management. The bondholders are interested in the maintenance
and management of the property securing the notes to the extent that its condition effects
the cash flow. Provisions specifically for the maintenance of the property show little
variation across the Sample. Separate covenants proscribing terms for management are
found in 11 of the 17 indentures, and statements requiring a specific firm be in charge of
the property management are found in 10 of the 11. Other permitted managers are then
qualified either in the covenant or "as described in the Mortgage" under restrictions on
transfer. Conditions for other management firms are provided in 4 of the 10 indentures
specifying firms within the covenant. The language of qualification generally requires
another "reputable and experienced" professional management company which manages at
least four to six regional shopping centers comprising at least four million square feet (see
Appendix D, Exhibit: 2).
Analysis. Bondholder influence over the property management attempts to control
inappropriate actions by the borrower through reliance on the experience and size of the
retained management firm. Covenants for the property's management are intended to
foreclose the possibility of a type of substitution. The management expertise is viewed as
an integral, though intangible, asset of the "firms" operation. The management covenant
seems to operate as a partial equivalent to a corporate bond restriction on the disposition
of assets, Smith and Warner [1990]. If management can be thought of as an asset in the
case of SP CMIBS, the covenant specifying a firm for this function also is a restriction on a
type of expertise transfer.
Management covenants are also clearly related to corporate covenants requiring the
maintenance of assets. Where not provided for in a separate covenant, the qualifications
for management of the property are usually then found in a provision of the transfer
covenant. In as much as the management expertise of a particular firm can effect the
consistency and health of the cash flow from the asset, the covenants of management are
present primarily to protect the operating value of the asset.
5.5.6 Test Ratios. Test ratios are not common in the mortgage covenants. While the
documents may indicate the DSCR and LTV (the most frequently used real estate test
ratios) at the time of issuance, seldom are- they included within the mortgage covenants
themselves. When included in the covenants, test ratios appear as a provision of
alterations, expansion or supplemental financing. As discussed earlier, DSCR and LTV
are measures of the cash flow relative to the debt service, and the principal amount of the
notes relative to the value of the property.
An example of an indenture which mandates test ratios is a recent private placement using
Rule 144A and offered simultaneously on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange. This multi-
tranche issue has as a part of the covenants a provision for supplemental financing. The
condition affecting the borrower's right to add more debt is a supplemental financing
DSCR of 1.3 to 1. It is interesting to note that this same indenture also is highly tailored
in terms of a covenant providing for the "Release of Future Anchor Sites and Peripheral
Parcels" and mandating a test ratio for DSCR as a condition for this action.
Analysis. Covenant specified test ratios are similar to the bonding covenants of corporate
bond as identified by Smith and Warner [1990]. They are found in only four of the 17
indentures examined and seem to correlate to three separate attributes. The first is that all
three issues of notes are secured by regional malls, though others in the Sample do not
contain provisions for test ratios. The second attribute in common is the fact that all three
are issuances of commercial mortgage pass-through certificates and not collateralized
mortgage obligations. The investor's undivided interest in the underlying mortgage, as is
typical of a pass-through structure, may influence this provision. Lastly, all three
indentures are multiple tranche investment vehicles. The performance based restrictions
would seem to be intended to protect the subordinate classes of bondholders. In the case
of the permitted supplemental financing, the test ratio of DSCR becomes more stringent
when the provision for financing is used. This "ratcheting-up" of the DSCR protects the
other tranches. Also interesting is the implied monitoring of the borrower by the lender
inherent with test ratios. The provisions for release of peripheral parcels and permitted
supplemental financing indicate an willingness by the lender to closely monitor the
property's financial condition.
5.6 Non-Covenant Restrictions
5.6.1 Locked-Boxes. Locked-boxes, or cash control established through the indenture
agreement, require that the issuer create a third party account in the name of the trustee
for the benefit of the bondholders. The borrower deposits debt service and or total cash
receipts depending on the agreement, into the locked-box. From this account, payments
are then made to the bondholders and to obligations such as collateral and reserve
accounts. Only after all expenses are paid does the borrower receive proceeds out of the
locked-box. As a consequence, this feature provides a strong incentive for the efficient
management of the property. Though not a covenant of the mortgage, the locked-box
restriction is a major feature looked for by investors and limiting to borrowers.
Analysis. Locked-box provisions of the indenture occur in 8 of the 17 issues (see
Appendix D, Exhibit 5), and tend to be a feature of the more recent agreements. There
seems to be no close analogy in corporate bonds for this restriction. The locked-box
feature is likely to become more prevalent in bank lending and securitization for
commercial real estate in the future. Its use in commercial mortgages has been an
outgrowth of losses experienced by traditional lenders. Lenders learned during the real
estate failures of the early 1990's that borrowers can control rental income to use funds
before the lender is able to enforce the letter of the loan documents. This results in
significant losses to the lender and in the event of bankruptcy, often gives the borrower the
resources to fend off the lender for an extended period.
5.6.2 Reserve Accounts. Reserve accounts act as a form of credit enhancement in a SP
CMBS issuance. The accounts are usually established by the issuer at the time of the
placement and are invested in fairly liquid instruments such as short term treasuries or
highly rated corporate securities. Given the low yields associated with these investments,
reserve accounts are costly to the borrower.
Analysis. An example of the reserve account requirement is illustrated by the 1211
Finance Corporation indenture--issued 11/93. In this agreement, the borrower establishes
two separate reserve accounts. The first is an initial reserve fund established out of the
proceeds of the offering and totals 13% of the amount raised. The second is an account
funded by the borrower on the first business day of each of four consecutive years
beginning in 1997. This account is in anticipation of the costs associated with re-leasing
the space currently occupied by the major tenant whose lease expires in the year 2000.
The total amount of this reserve equals approximately 6% of the original principal balance.
5.6.3 Interest Rate Agreements. Commercial mortgage-backed securities issued with
floating rate interest structures are required by the rating agencies to have interest rate
agreements as a part of the indenture. Purchase of an interest rate cap is accomplished
through a contract with an interest rate counterparty having sufficient credit quality to
ensure the payment of interest overage. This expense is a part of the cost of the
transaction and tends to be a part of shorter maturity issues which utilize floating rate
obligations.
Analysis. Of the 17 indentures examined, 9 have variable or floating rate coupons (see
Appendix D, Exhibit 5), all of these are offered in the U.S. and in the eurobond market.
The rates are tied to a stated spread above the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR).
It is interesting to note that all but one of the floating and variable rate issues appear in the
1992 and 1993 indentures. Four issues from November 1993 through the first quarter of
1994 are fixed rate agreements. The last indenture, from April 1994, has a fixed rate of
interest for the first year and then is indexed to LIBOR thereafter. The four fixed rate
indentures may reflect a change in the perceived direction of rates at the end of 1993.
From the borrower's point of view, the 1992 and 1993 interest rate environment favored
floating and variable rates due to the continued decline in rates. In contrast, the upward
direction in interest rates would correspond to a probable borrower preference for fixed
rate agreements.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper examines the mortgage and indenture covenants of recent SP CMBS
prospectuses to determine the degree of variation and the attributes affecting that
variation. The 14 prospectuses from 1992 to the present show that covenant restrictions
contain similar language and content during this period. In addition, the results of this
analysis indicate that SP CMBS underwriting standards have 1.) converged toward a
standardization of indenture covenant restrictions and 2.) reflect the conservative criteria
of the post-recession real estate recovery. Where significant variation of the indentures is
found, it is in reference to borrowers' rights to expand and contract the property,
provisions for additional financing and casualty. Less frequently occurring covenants such
as specified management, special maintenance, defeasance and financial statements must
also be considered as variations.
In addition, no significant correlation between placement type and covenant structure is
evident. To the contrary, the relative agreement found in the format of the documents
indicates a strong preference for standardization of this instrument. This standardization
serves the development of secondary market trading. Yet as a consequence, any observed
variations in covenant restrictions must gain greater value due to the standardization. The
convergence in language and content of covenants should contribute to their efficient
evaluation of SP CMBS issues for secondary market activity. Where differences are
apparent, these can be considered for their option value relative to the borrower or the
investor. Valuation of these differences is proposed for additional research in this area.
Further study of single-property securities should also address the performance of SP
CMBS in comparison to conventional commercial mortgages originated in similar amounts
and time periods. Does one format or the other offer significantly lower rates of default?
Are Default rates for SP CMBS responsive to the same factors observed in default rates of
commercial mortgages? Further, using the Asquith and Wizman [1990] methodology, can
one ascribe the success or failure of SP CMBS issues to the structure of the covenants?
As pricing information becomes available through the development of secondary markets
for CMBS and SP CMBS, research should be done to determine the effects of certain
covenants relative to a given security's performance over time.
As discussed in chapter 4, SP CMBS instruments resemble conventional mortgages in
terms of investor concerns over default risk. The Snyderman study (Snyderman, [1994]),
indicates that the performance of commercial mortgage loans are effected by both the
standards of underwriting and the economic conditions at the time of origination.
Extending the argument to SP CMBS, securitized debt obligations should reflect the
performance of their commercial counterparts. Furthermore, the performance of the
properties that have been securitized in recent years should conform to the performance of
commercial mortgages underwritten in the mid to late-1970's.
Finally, the function and the structure of the SP CMBS covenants have parallels to
corporate indentures. Comparisons between the two serve a useful purpose in
understanding the hybrid quality of single-property mortgage-backed securities. Effective
evaluation of these instruments depends on the transfer of concepts derived from the study
of corporate indentures.
APPENDICES
Appendix A
Investment Characteristics of Mortgage-Related Securities
MBB MPT MPTB CMO
Type of security interest acquired Debt Equity Debt Debt
Number of security classes One One One Multiple
Pass-through of principal None Direct Direct Prioritized
Party bearing prepayment risk Issuer Investor Investor Investor
Overcollateralization Yes NA No No
Overcollateral marked to market? Yes No Yes No
Credit enhancements used? Yes No No No
Maturity period known? Yes No No No
Calamity &
Call provisions? Possibly Cleanup Possibly nuisance
Off-balance-sheet financing possible? No Yes No Yes
SOURCE: Brueggeman and Fisher, Real Estate Finance Investments, Irwin Inc., Boston, MA, 1993, p.
7 8 4
.
Appendix B
Total Issuance--Single Property CMBS
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Dollars (Millions)
Study Sample
Number
1,014.0
810.0
4
713.3 742.0 484.3 972.5
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 6 8 9
1,864.6 889.7 690.5 2,647.5
0.0 0.0 203.0 1,069.0
9 10 8 23
Name
o & Y Development $450.0
Fluor Corp. 204.0
Fsiher Brothers 160.0
0 & Y Maiden Lane 200.0
0 & Y Water Street 548.3
Parklabrea 165.0
Southbury 279.0
75 State Street 286.5
One United Bank 107.0
560 Lexco 26.0
Sonesta 33.0
Penn South 10.5
Casa Arroyo 13.5
Somers Associates 206.0
Corte Madera 40.0
Westvaco 13.9
O & Y Gulf Canada 160.0
El Senorial Mail 4.6
Trujillo Alto 6.3
Hahn JMC 40.0
Marsh & McLennan 200.0
National Archives 300.7
Marriott Hotel 14.8
Sheraton Centre 12.7
Federal Judiciary 159.8
Headquarters Corp 40.0
1185 Ave Americas 57.0
100 First Finance 115.0
Two Rector 72.5
Unidentified 55.0
Unidentified 100.0
Menlo Park 175.0
Sears, Roebuck 850.0
Postal Square 193.0
Sheraton Winnipeg 16.8
Caesars World 9.8
Stoneridge 75.0
1999 Star Finance 390.0
Messe Finance 564.0
600 Community 32.3
Roberts Mill 9.5
Appendix B. (Continued)
Name 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
US West Coimun. 10.8
Caribbean Isles 4.7
Lake Highlander 4.7
Sports Club/LA 25.7
May Centers II 75.0
Walden Apartments 5.5
Apple Computer Inc. 157.5
Nassif Bldg Financ'g 145.0
Franklin Park 51.0
Water Tower 170.0
Willowbrook 90.0
Blue Bell Funding 65.0
Crossroads 23.5
Sunrise Mall 56.0
Lakewood Mall 90.0
US Realty 65.0
Plaza Juana Diaz 15.5
Princeton Circle 2.6
Fashion Show 36.0
Regency Square 57.5
Edison Mall 41.0
Northside Parkway 31.2
FNBC 1993 240.3
Park Avenue Assoc. 32.5
Trump Plaza 330.0
Ross Park Mall 60.0
EQ Green Acres 118.0
Veritas 121.0
Woodfield 172.0
Santa Anna Venture 80.0
USC Oakbrook 140.0
Pacific Acquisition 65.0
Vomado 227.0
SSMC III & IV LP 127.0
RE First Inc. 187.9
Seven World Trade 250.0
Lakeside 88.0
Sawgrass 160.0
SOURCE: Commercial Mortgage Alert
Appendix C
Exhibit 1
May-85 Dec-85 Dec-85 April-92 July-92 Dec-92
Office
Shearson
Office
Salomon
Office
Salomon
Mall
GS
Mall
GS
Mall
GS
Restrictions on guarantees of other obligations 0 1 1 1 1 1
Restrictions on engaging in other business 0 1 1 1 1 1
Restrictions on further indebtedness 0 1 1 1 11
Restrictions on investments 0 1 1 1 1 1
Restrictions on the acceleration of subordinated 0 0 0 1 1 1
debt
Restrictions on the filing for bankruptcy 0 0 0 1 1 1
Restrictions on the issuance of securities 0 0 0 1 1 1
Restrictions on dissolving or liquidating, 0 1 1 0 0 0
Payment of real estate taxes011000
Maintenance of insurance 1 1 1 1 1 1
Compliance with applicable laws and private 1 1 1 1 1 1
agreements affecting the Property
Discharge of liens 1 1 1 1 1 1
Restrictions on additional indebtedness 0 0 1 1 1 1
Modifications to Easements 0 0 0 1 1 1
Borrower's rights to make alterations to property 1 1 1 1 11
(below prescribed dollar amount)
Requirement that leases executed by Borrower be 0 0 0 1 1 1
at fair market value
Borrower's rights for expansion or contraction of 1 1 1 0 0 1
the property
Maintenance of property 1 1 1 1 1 1
Management Requirement 0 0 1 0 0 1
Special provisions for maintenance 0 1 1 0 0 1
Exhibit 1 (continued)
MORTGAGE (continued) 1 2 3 4 5 6
Restictions on transfers 0 0 1 1 1 1
Casualty provisions 0 1 1 1 1 1
Partial Condemnation provisions 1 1 1 0 0 1
Condemnation provisions 1 1 1 1 1 1
Events of Default 1 1 1 1 1 1
Modification 1 1 1 I 1 1
Title Insurance 1 0 0 1 1 1
Defeasance; substitute collateral 0 1 1 0 0 1
Financial Statements 1 0 0 1 1 0
Non-Recourse 0 1 1 1 1 1
Restrictions on Borrower's engaging in business 0 0 0 1 1 1
other than the transaction
Restrictions on commingling of its assets 0 0 0 1 1 1
Restrictions on additional indebtedness 0 0 0 1 1 1
Restriction agianst partitioning the property 0 0 0 0 0 0
Restriction against Bankruptcy filings 0 0 0 0 0 0
Restriction agalnst transfer or lease of the property 0 0 0 0 0 0
Restrictions agalnst the guarantee of other 0 0 0 0 0 0
obligations
COVENANTS OF TIHEINDENTUIRE
Limitation of Issuer's right to liquidate, dissolve or 0 1 1 0 0 0
issue any equity securities
Limitation of Issuer's right to consolidate, merge or 0 1 1 0 0 0
transfer its assets
Provisions for modification of Indenture agreement 0 1 1 0 0 0
Exhibit 2
7 8 9 10 11 12
Feb-93 March-93 June-93 August-92 Oct-93 Nov-93
Mall
JPM
Mall
Merrill
Casino
Merrill
Mall
GS
Mall
GS
Mall
Lehman
COVENANTS OF~ ISSUER
Restrictions on guarantees of other obligations 1 1 0 1 1 0
Restrictions on engaging in other business 1 1 0 1 1 0
Restrictions on further indebtedness 1 1 0 1 1 0
Restrictions on investments 1 1 0 1 1 0
Restrictions on the acceleration of subordinated 0 0 0 1 1 0
debt
Restrictions on the filing for bankruptcy 1 1 0 0 1 1
Restrictions on the issuance of securities 0 0 0 0 0 0
Restrictions on dissolving or liquidating, 0 0 0 0 0 0
consolidating, merging or transfering
Modification of Indenture 1 1 1 1 1 1
Payment of real estate taxes 1 1 0 0 1 1
Maintenance of insurance 1 1 1 1 1 1
Compliance with applicable laws and private 0 0 1 1 1 0
agreements affecting the Property
Discharge of liens 0 0 1 1 1 0
Restrictions on additional Indebtedness 0 1 1 1 1 1
Modifications to Easements 0 0 0 1 1 0
Borrower's rights to make alterations to property 1 1 0 1 1 1
(below prescribed dollar amount)
Borrower's rights for expansion or contraction of 1 1 0 1 1 1
the property
Requirement that leases executed by Borrower be 1 0 0 0 1 1
at fair market value
Maintenance of property 0 1 1 1 1 1
Management requirements 1 1 0 0 1 1
Special provisions for maintenance 0 1 1 1 0 0
Exhibit 2 (continued)
MORTGAGE (continued) 10 11 12
Restictions on transfers I 1 1 1 1 1
Casualty provisions 1 0 0 0 1 1
Partial Condemnation provisions 0 0 1 1 1 1
Condemnation provisions 1 1 1 1 1 1
Events of Default 1 1 1 1 1 1
Modification 0 1 0 1 1 0
Title Insurance 1 0 1 0 1 1
Defeasance; substitute collateral 0 0 1 1 0 0
Financial Statements 0 0 1 0 1 0
Non-Recourse 1 1 1 1 1 1
Restrictions on Borrower's engaging in business 1 1 0 1 1 1
other than the transaction
Restrictions on commingling of its assets 1 1 0 1 11
Restrictions on additional indebtedness 1 1 0 1 1 1
Restriction agianst partitioning the property 0 0 0 0 1 1
Restriction against Bankruptcy filings 0 0 0 0 0 1
Restriction against transfer or lease of the property 0 0 0 0 0 1
Restrictions against the guarantee of other 0 0 0 0 1 1
obligations
COVENANTS OF TH E INDENTURE
Limitation of Issuer's right to liquidate, dissolve or 0 0 0 0 0 0
issue any equity securities
Limitation of Issuer's right to consolidate, merge or 0 0 0 0 0 0
transfer its assets
Provisions for modification of Indenture agreement 0 0 0 0 0 0
... .......... . ...... ..  .... ... . ... ......... 
Exhibit 3
13 14 15 16 17
Nov-93 Dec-93 Feb-94 April-94 March-94
Office Mall Mall Mall Mall
COEAT ISSUR
Restrictions on guarantees of other obligations 1 0 0 0 0
Restrictions on engaging in other business 1 0 0 0 0
Restrictions on further indebtedness 1 0 0 0 0
Restrictions on investments 0 0 0 0 0
Restrictions on the acceleration of subordinated 0 0 0 0 0
debt
Restrictions on the filing for bankruptcy 1 0 1 0 0
Restrictions on the issuance of securities 0 0 0 0 0
Restrictions on dissolving or liquidating, 1 0 0 0 0
consolidating, merging or transfering
Modification of Indenture 1 1 1 0 1
Payment of real estate taxes 1 0 1 0 0
Maintenance of insurance 1 1 1 1 1
Compliance with applicable laws and private 0 0 0 1 0
agreements affecting the Property
Discharge of liens 0 1 0 1 1
Restrictions on additional Indebtedness 1 1 1 1 1
Modifications to Easements 0 0 0 0 0
Borrower's rights to make alterations to property 1 1 1 1 1
(below prescribed dollar amount)
Borrower's rights for expansion or contraction of 1 1 1 1 1
the property
Requirement that leases executed by Borrower be 0 1 1 1 1
at fair market value
Maintenance of property 1 1 1 1 1
Management requirements 0 0 1 1 1
Special provisions for maintenance 1 1 0 1 0
1 10
Exhibit 3 (continued)
MORTGAGE (Continued) 13 14 15 16
Restictions on transfers 1 1 1 1
Casualty provisions 1 1 1 1 1
Partial Condemnation provisions 1 1 1 1 0
Condemnation provisions 1 1 1 1 1
Events of Default 0 1 1 1 1
Modification of Mortgage 1 1 1 1
Title Insurance 0 1 1 11
Defeasance; substitute collateral 0 0 0 1 0
Financial Statements 1 0 1 1
Non-Recourse 1 1 1 1 1
.NEGAIVE COVENANTS .......................
Restrictions on Borrower's engaging in business 1 0 1 1 0
other than the transaction
Restrictions on commingling of its assets 1 0 1 1 0
Restrictions on additional indebtedness 1 0 1 1 0
Restriction agianst partitioning the property 1 0 1 1 0
Restriction against Bankruptcy filings 1 0 1 1 1
Restriction against transfer or lease of the property 1 0 1 1 1
Restrictions against the guarantee of other 0 0 1 1 0
obligations
Limitation of Issuer's right to liquidate, dissolve or 1 0 0 0 0
issue any equity securities
Limitation of Issuer's right to consolidate, merge or 1 0 0 0 0
transfer its assets
Provisions for modification of Indenture agreement 1 0 0 0 0
5 15
5 13
4 12
5 17
4 16
5 14
4 12
1 6
3 8
5 16
3 11
3 11
3 11
3 5
4 5
4 5
2 4
1 3
1 3
1 3
Appendix D
Exhibit: 1
Covenants of Alterations
# Property Issued Placement No No Thrshld Arch. Rating Security
Adverse Default
1 Office 05/85 EURO Yes No 5% Yes No No
2 Office 12/85 EURO Yes No 2.5% Yes No Yes
3 Office 12/85 EURO/144A Yes Yes 1.25% Yes No Yes
4 Mall 04/92 EURO/144A Yes No 5% No Yes Yes
5 Mall 07/92 EURO/144A Yes No 5% No Yes Yes
6 Mall 12/92 EURO/144A Yes No 8% No Yes Yes
7 Mall 02/93 144A Yes No 5% No No Yes
8 Mall 03/93 EURO/144A Yes No 5% No Yes Yes
9 Casino 06/93 Public NA NA NA NA NA NA
10 Mall 07/93 EURO/144A Yes No 5% No Yes Yes
11 Mall 10/93 EURO/144A Yes No 5% No Yes Yes
12 Mall 11/93 EURO/144A Yes Yes 5% No Yes Yes
13 Office 11/93 Public Yes Yes 5% Yes Yes Yes
14 Mall 12/93 Public Yes No sqft No No Yes
15 Mall 02/94 144A Yes Yes 5% Yes No Yes
16 Mall 03/94 144A Yes Yes 5% Yes Yes Yes
17 Mall 03/94 EURO/144A Yes Yes 0.7% No Yes Yes
DEFINITION OF TERMS:
Prospectus/Memorandum
Property Type of real estate asset securing the mortgage.
Issued Date of prospectus or issue of securities.
Placement Means by which the notes were sold to the public.
No Adverse Covenant requires confirmation that alteration will not have a "material adverse effect of
the fair market value of the property."
No Default No mortgage event of default can have occurred or be occurring for alterations to
commence.
Threshold Percentage of original principal balance of the notes under which borrower needs no
consent for performing alterantions.
Arch. Provision that an independent architect (or engineer) be retained for any alteration
exceeding Threshold Amount.
Rating If additional collateral is required, does it need to have a minimum rating by a specified
agency.
Security If cost of alteration exceeds Threshold Amount is the borrower required to post additional
collateral.
Exhibit: 2
Covenants of Management
# Property Issued Placement "First- Firm Number SqFt
Class"
1 Office 05/85 EURO NA NA NA NA
2 Office 12/85 EURO No Owner No No
3 Office 12/85 EURO/144A No Yes No No
4 Mall 04/92 EURO/144A NA NA NA NA
5 Mall 07/92 EURO/144A NA NA NA NA
6 Mall 12/92 EURO/144A No Yes 6 Malls 4 million
7 Mall 02/93 144A Yes Yes 6 Mall 4 Million
8 Mall 03/93 EURO/144A Yes Yes No No
9 Casino 06/93 Public NA NA NA NA
10 Mall 07/93 EURO/144A No Yes 6 Malls 4 Million
11 Mall 10/93 EURO/144A No Yes 6 Malls 5 Million
12 Mall 11/93 EURO/144A Yes Yes No No
13 Office 11/93 Public Yes Yes No No
14 Mall 12/93 Public NA NA NA NA
15 Mall 02/94 144A Yes Yes No No
16 Mall 03/94 144A No Yes No No
17 Mall 03/94 EURO/144A NA NA NA NA
DEFINITION OF TERMS:
# Prospectus/Memorandum
Property Type of real estate asset securing the mortgage.
Issued Date of prospectus or issue of securities.
Placement Means by which the notes were sold to the public.
"First-Class" A reference to the language used to describe standard of property
management.
Firm Whether or not the covenant requires a specific management firm.
Number Qualifications for alternate management firm measured by the number of
regional shopping malls managed by such firm.
SqFt Qualifications for alternate management firm measured by total amount of
regional shopping square footage under such firm's management.
Exhibit: 3
Covenants of Additional Indebtedness
# PntM Issued Placemnent All Pari Passu SiLL Unsec' Tenant Affiliates Threshold 'rest Ratios fc-Q-f Na Cash Flow
____ _ _Fitout Y_1_ Value Defanult
I Office 05//85 EURO Yes NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2 Office 12/85 EURO No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No DSCR/LTV 85% No Yes
3 Office 12/85 EURO No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No DSCR/LTV 100% NO Yes
4 Mall 04/92 EURO/144A No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 5% No 80% No Yes
5 Mall 07/92 EURO/144A No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 5% No 80% No Yes
6 Mall 12/92 EURO/144A No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 8% No 80% No Yes
7 Mall 02/93 144A No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 6% No 80% No Yes
8 Mall 03/93 EURO/144A No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 5% DSCR 80% No Yes
9 Casino 06/93 Public No Yes Yes Yes NA NA No DSCR No No No
10 Mail 07/93 EURO/144A No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 5% No 80% No Yes
11 Mall 10/93 EURO/144A No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 5% No 80% No Yes
12 Mall 11/93 EURO/144A No No Yes Yes Yes NA 5% No 80% Yes Yes
13 Office 11/93 Public No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 5% No 70% Yes Yes
14 Mall 12/93 Public No No Yes Yes Yes No 5% No NO Yes Yes
15 Mall 02/94 144A No No Yes Yes Yes NA 5% No 80% Yes Yes
16 Mall 03/94 144A No No Yes Yes Yes NA 5% No No Yes No
17 Mall 03/94 EURO/144A No Yes* Yes Yes Yes Yes 5% DSCR 80% Yes Yes
*Indicates additional covenant for permitted supplemental financing.
DEFINITION OF TERMS:
# Prospectus/Memorandum
Property Type of real estate asset securing the mortgage.
Issued Date of Prospectus or issue of securities.
Placement Means by which the notes were sold to the Public.
Exhibit: 3 (continued)
Continued
All Borrower allowed to add any debt without consent of trustee.
Pari Passu Borrower Allowed to add pari passu debt without consent of trustee.
Sub. Mortg. Borrower may place a subordiate mortgage on the property without the consent of the trustee.
Unsec'd Borrower may assume indebtedness not secured by the property, incurred in the ordinary
course of business, without the consent of the trustee.
Tenant Fitout Borrower may incur indebtedness, not secured by the property, to tenants to pay or reimburse
for tenant fit out work.
Affiliates Indebtednes either secured or unsecured to affiliates (with restrictions).
Threshold Percentage of principal value of notes below which the borrower is free to incur indebtedness
without the consent of the trustee.
Test Ratios Performance based measures included in the covenant for establishing borrower's right to
incur additional debt--usually for any amount above the threshold.
% of Value Maximum percentage of the property's current value that is permissible as debt. Determined
by adding new financing to the outstanding principal value of the notes as a percentage of
appraised value of property.
No Default A requirement that no mortgage event of default can be existing at the time of request for
consent to additional financing.
Cash Flow Provision stating that payments on additional financing shall be made only to the extent of
available cash flow from the property.
Exhibit: 4
Covenants of Casualty and Condemnation
i Property Issued Placement Casualty Part. Condemn, Threshold Trustee Obligation NQ Repay @ Penalty or Excess $
Cond. to Restore Default Pasr Premium ___
I Office 05/85 EURO NA NA Yes* No No No No No No NA
2 Office 12/85 EURO Yes Yes Yes 40%** No Yes No Yes No NA
3 Office 12/85 EURO Yes Yes Yes 3.75% Yes Yes Yes Yes No Repay
4 Mail 04/92 EURO/144A Yes No Yes 5% Yes Yes No Yes No Repay
5 Mail 07/92 EURO/144A Yes No Yes 5% Yes Yes No Yes No Repay
6 Mail 12/16 EURO/144A Yes Yes Yes 4% > T Yes No Yes No Repay
7 MalI 02/93 144A Yes Yes Yes 5% No Yes, > T No Yes No Repay
8 Mall 03/93 EURO/144A Yes Yes Yes 5% No Yes, > T No Yes No Repay
9 Casino 06/93 Public NA NA Yes No NA No No Yes No NA
10 Mall 07/93 EURO/144A Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No Repay
11 Mall 10/93 EURO/144A Yes Yes Yes 3.2-5% Yes, > T No No Yes No Repay
12 Mall 11/93 EURO/144A Yes Yes Yes 5% Yes, >T Yes Yes Yes No Repay
13 Office 11/93 Public Yes Yes Yes 5% No Yes Yes Yes No Repay
14 Mall 12/93 Public Yes Yes Yes 5% Yes, > T Yes Yes Yes No Repay
15 Mall 02/94 144A Yes Yes Yes 5% Yes, > T Yes Yes Yes No Repay
16 Mall 03/94 144A Yes Yes Yes*** 5% Yes, > T Yes Yes Yes No Repay
17 Mall 03/93 EURO/144A Yes Yes Yes 2% Yes, > T Yes Yes Yes No**** Repay****
*The notes are guaranteed by the mortgagor.
**Above this % constitutes a "Total Taking." Borrower has the right to Prepay without premium.
***In the event of "Total Taking" borrower has the right to retain $250,000 of proceeds. The
remainder is given to trustee to apply to prepayment of notes.
****Borrower is permitted to retain proceeds in excess of cost of restoration
(see text--Casualty, Partial Condemnation and Condemnation).
DEFINITION
Exhibit: 4 (continued)
OF TERMS: (Covenants of Casualty and Condemnation)
# Prospectus/Memorandum
Property Type of real estate asset securing the mortgage.
Issued Date of Prospectus or issue of securities.
Placement Means by which the notes were sold to the Public.
Casualty Whether or not the indenture has a covenant for Casualty.
Part. Cond. Whether or not the indenture has a covenant for Partial Condemnation.
Condemnation Whether or not the indenture has a provision for Condemnation.
Threshold Percentage of principal balance of the notes used to establish the Threshold.
Trustee Does the trustee have control over insurance proceeds--conditions--( >T indicates trustee
control of insurance proceeds in excess of the Threshold Amount.)
Obligation Is the Borrower under a general obligation to restore the property in the event of casualty.
No Default Does the covenant require that no mortgage event of default can be occuring for disbursement
of insurance proceeds to go directly to the borrower.
Repay @ par Is the borrower allowed to repay (prepay) the notes at par if not required to restore the
property.
Penalty or Penalty or premium associated with prepayment under provisions of casualty or defaut.
Premium
Excess $ Is the borrower permitted to retain proceeds in excess of the cost of restoration.
Exhibit 5
Non-Covenant Restrictions
Advances/Locked-boxes/Interest Rate Agreements
# Property Security Issued Advances Locked-box Interest Rate
Aireement
1 Office Guaranteed Notes 05/85 No No No
2 Office Secured Notes 12/85 No No No
3 Office Secured Notes 12/85 No No No
4 Mall Collateralized VRNs & FRNs 04/92 No No Yes
5 Mall Collateralized VRNs & FRNs 07/92 No No Yes
6 Mall Collateralized FRNs 12/92 No No Yes
7 Mall Collateralized FRNs 02/93 No Collateral Account Yes
8 Mall Collateralized FRNs 03/93 No Operating Account Yes
9 Casino Guaranteed Mortgage Notes 06/93 No No No
10 Mall Collateralized FRNs 08/93 No Yes Yes
11 Mall Collateralized FRNs 10/93 No Yes Yes
12 Mall Mortgage Collateralized Notes 11/93 No Lease Assignment Yes
13 Office Mortgage Collateralized Notes 11/93 Yes Yes No
14 Mall Pass-Through Certificates 12/93 Yes No No
15 Mall Mortgage Notes 02/94 No Lease Assignment No
16 Mall Pass-Through Certificates 03/94 Yes Yes No
17 Mall Pass-Through Certificates 03/94 Yes Yes Yes
DEFINITION OF TERMS:
# Prospectus/ Memorandum
Property Type of real estate asset securing the mortgage.
Security Type of mortgage-backed instrument involved
Issued Date of prospectus or issue of securities
Advances Whether or not the servicer will make interest and or principal
advances when borrower does not.
Locked-box Does the trustee or servicer have direct control over the cash flow from
the property.
Interest Rate Has the borrower purchased an interest rate agreement.
Agreement
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